Disaster Risk Analysis of the Emergency Transportation Road for Large-scale Disasters in Japan by アハメド ワヒド ウッディン & Ahmed Wahid Uddin
 Disaster Risk Analysis of the Emergency 
Transportation Road for Large-scale 
















In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 




Division of Environmental Science and Engineering 

































   Historically, destructive natural disasters have posed the greatest 
challenge for Japanese society. Unfavorable geographical, topographical and 
meteorological conditions of the country have made it one of the most 
disaster prone countries in the world. Although its territory accounts merely 
for the 0.25 % of the planet’s land area, Japan is subject to about 20 % 
earthquakes with the magnitude 6 or more and 7 % the world’s active 
volcanoes is located on its territory. 
   The most frequent natural hazards in Japan are earthquakes, tsunamis, 
typhoons, volcano eruptions, floods and landslides. Occasional torrential 
rains and heavy snows are another challenge for the country. The high 
number of earthquakes, tsunamis and active volcanoes are the conditioned 
by the fact that territory of Japan forms the part Circum-Pacific Seismic Belt 
which is sometimes called as the Pacific Ring of Fire. 
   Although remarkable successes has been achieved in increasing 
preparedness of the country –crucial role of them, MLIT and Prefectural 
government is must be emphasized in disaster preparedness – to earthquakes 
and tsunamis, the big disaster caused by them –Great Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake and Great East Japan Earthquakes demonstrated that they still 
remain as the biggest challenge for disaster management system in the 
country. 
  Based on the lessons of Japan's Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, 
emergency transportation routes set to provide rescuing activities and 
transportation of goods immediately after the occurrence of earthquakes. The 
emergency transportation routes connect with the expressways, general 
highways and main roads and also links together with disaster prevention 




bases those are designated by the government.  
   In recent years, natural disasters occur frequently in Japan. Not only the 
large-scale low-frequency disaster like earthquakes or eruption, but also the 
small-scale high-frequency disaster like landslides or flood occur frequently 
accompanied by the heavy torrential rain. For such a situation, the 
designation of the emergency transportation road is accomplished for a large-
scale earthquake disaster in Japan. The network of designated road is 
maintained to become able to transport smooth supplies at the time of a large-
scale disaster. 
   Although emergency transportation route is a cornerstone of emergency 
transport, research of vulnerability as a road network for disaster risk and 
disasters of emergency transportation route has not been sufficiently carried 
out so far. 
   In this study, in chapter 4; the risk of emergency transportation road 
network was quantitatively evaluated considering the various hazards such 
as earthquakes, floods, landslides, tsunami, volcanic and storm surges. As a 
result, the currently disaster risk of the road that is designated the emergency 
transportation road network is high, and it became clear to be impassable in 
the case of floods, landslides, and volcanic disaster. In addition, emergency 
transportation road network at the time of Tokai, Tonankai and Nankai 
earthquakes it became clear the risk is high to be impassable. 
   In chapter 5, it is analyzed the reachability between disaster prevention 
bases, e.g. Prefectural and municipal offices in consideration of the building 
collapse of the emergency transportation road within 6 prefectures. In this 
study, we analyzed the disaster risk of emergency transportation roads 
regarding the flood and building collapse those are responsible for road 




blockage caused by river flooding and earthquake respectively. Based on the 
analysis of disaster risk, we analyzed reachability of emergency 
transportation road between the prefectural and municipal offices. The target 
area of the study is the six prefectures namely Ishikawa, Toyama, Fukui, 
Niigata, Nagano and Gifu. The network analysis of impassable section of the 
emergency transport road that could be flooded by the river flooding, except 
the Niigata and Nagano Prefecture, it is revealed that more than 80% was 
unreachable between the disaster prevention bases e.g. prefecture and 
municipal offices. In the analysis of the building collapsed by earthquake 
that make road blockage, we considered the road-side building of emergency 
transportation roads. For the building collapse, we take the measurement 
seismic intensity which is a 2% exceedance probability for 50 years. Among 
the wide range of the six prefectures, the maximum unreachability cases 
occurred for the municipal offices were in the Niigata and Nagano Prefecture. 
   In chapter 6, as a case study, it is analyzed the actual situation and 
evacuation behavior of a large scale flood disaster e.g. Asanogawa flood, 
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   Disaster is a serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society causing 
widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses which exceeds the ability 
of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. Disasters are events 
of huge magnitude and negative impacts on society and the environment. Disaster is also 
defined as a crisis situation causing widespread damage which far exceeds our ability to 
recover (Wassenhove, Van L.N, 2006).  
  Disaster studies towards the end of the 20th Century demonstrated the inability of 
science and technology to reduce social vulnerability and enhance adaptive capacity 
(Haque, 1988; Rasid and Mallik, 1995; Hewitt, 1997; Godschalk et al., 1998). The 
research drew awareness to the need for the public’s input in disaster management 
(Dorcey et al., 1994; Mileti, 1999; Pearce, 2003). Policy recommendations from this body 
of research encouraged more anticipatory and sustainable solutions to address livelihood 
risk and increase citizen representation in risk decision-making (Lavell, 1998; Patton et 
al., 2000; Wisner et al., 2004). 
  Disaster can hit anywhere, at any time and take any form, it can be natural disasters as 
we have seen too often in our recent past or man-made. They affect communities and 
nations, causing human life losses and material damages. One classification of disasters 
includes the following four causes (Star, 2007) namely; by human error and technological 
failures, by intentional malevolence, by acts of nature, and combinations of some or all 




the previous. The four causes of disasters are considered, generally, low probability-high 
impact events, meaning, they are events with low probability of occurrence but with high 
impact on the community or the environment. Regarding by acts of nature, the 
International Disaster Database EM-DAT categorized the natural disaster into 5 sub-
groups, which in turn cover 12 disaster types and more than 30 sub-types (Figure 1). 
     
 
Figure 1: Natural disaster classifications (Annual Disaster Statistical Data 2012; EMDAT) 
 
  In the last four decades, based on the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT), 
between 1970-1979 and 2000-2012, the number of natural disaster events reported 
globally increased significantly from 837 to 4,939 or increased almost six times. Over the 
whole period of 1970-2012, 40.8 percent of these natural disasters occurred in Asia. 
Figure 2 portrays the increasing trend of natural disasters reported by region of the 
continent. Such increases are allegedly associated with the increasing of population 
exposed to hazards. 





Figure 2: Number of natural disasters reported, 1970-2012. 
 
Recently, natural disasters with devastating effects on human settlements have 
proliferated. Since urban settlements are habitats of human beings where are densely 
populated and constructed (infrastructure and buildings), they have high natural disaster 
risks. Unless the new planning strategies integrated with disaster mitigation approaches 
are not applied into the urbanization process, urban settlements unfortunately will still 
have high natural disaster risks. There are some main principles, policies, strategies, and 
standards to guide disaster prone urban settlements to mitigate disasters. 
The concept of disaster resilience has been developed in the 21st century, in lieu of 
the previous concept of disaster resistance. Unlike the concept of disaster resistance, the 
concept of disaster resilience emphasizes elasticity and flexibility in coping with the 
particular challenges of the various natural disasters (Vale, L. J., Campanella, T. J.; 2005). 
Especially, with regard to the uncertainty of natural disasters, the term of resilience can 
provide a better guidance to produce effective disaster mitigation approaches in urban 
settlements. The disaster resilience concept is defined in terms of the adaptation capacity 




of a settlement system (built up and non-built up environment as well as community of 
life) potentially exposed to natural hazards with a view to maintaining or restoring an 
acceptable level of functioning and structure (Greiving et al.,2006). 
The escalation of large-scale natural disasters in recent years such as the devastation 
earthquake and tsunami event in Japan and Indonesia in March 2011 and December 2004, 
respectively, the extreme floods in India, Germany and Switzerland in July and August 
2005, the extensive bushfires due to severe droughts in Portugal and Spain in the same 
period, and Hurricane Katrina, which devastated the south-east coast of United States in 
August 2005 have caused fatalities, disruptions of livelihood, and enormous economic 
loss. These events show dramatically how the ongoing global environmental change and 
also an inadequate coastal defense, lack of early warning and unsustainable practices, and 
even neglect can affect people all over the world. Table 1 describes the natural disaster 
occurrences and impacts by region. 
In 2012, Asia was most often hit by natural disasters (40.6%), followed by the 
Americas (22.1%), Europe (18.2%), Africa (16.0%) and Oceania (3.1%). This regional 
distribution of disaster occurrence is comparable to the profiled observed from 2001 to 
2010, but all continents except Europe showed numbers of disasters below their 2002-
2011 average. In Europe, in 2012, disasters occurred three times more than in 2011. Asia 
accounted in 2012 for 64.5% of worldwide reported disaster victims, while Africa 
accounted for 30.4%.Compared to the annual average number of victims from 2002 to 
2011, the number of victims in Africa and Oceania increased, whereas fewer victims were 
reported in the Americas, Asia and Europe. 
 
 




Table 1: Natural disaster occurrence and impacts: regional figures 
[Source: Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2012: The numbers and trends] 
 
 
2. Natural Hazards and Associated Disasters 
  
Natural hazards are severe and extreme weather and climate events that occur naturally 
in all parts of the world, although some regions are more vulnerable to certain hazards 




than others. Natural hazards become natural disasters when people’s lives and livelihoods 
are destroyed. Human and material losses caused by natural disasters are a major obstacle 
to sustainable development. By issuing accurate forecasts and warnings in a form that is 
readily understood and by educating people how to prepare against such hazards, before 
they become disasters, lives and property can be protected. 
By natural hazards we refer to potentially damaging physical events and phenomena, 
which may cause the loss of life, injury or human life disruption, property damage, social, 
economic, and political disruption, or environmental degradation. Natural hazards can be 
divided into different groups: geological, hydro-meteorological, climatological, outer 
space, and biological1 hazards (e.g., AIDS or Ebola). Natural hazards can be single, 
multiple, or concatenated in time and local, regional and global in space. Each natural 
hazard is characterized by its location, intensity and probability. 
A disaster can be referred to a serious disruption of the normal functioning of a 
community or a society causing widespread human, material, economic or environmental 
losses which exceed the ability of the affected community/society to cope using its own 
resources. A disaster is a function of the risk process, and results from the combination of 
hazards, conditions of vulnerability and insufficient capacity or measures or even interest 
to reduce the potential negative consequences of risk, and exposure. 
For the last 35 years the frequency of the disasters associated with natural hazard events 
has been steadily increasing (Fig. 3). An average number of 405 events per year were 
registered by Munich Re in 1980-1989, 650 events in the 1990s, 780 events for the period 
of 2000-2009, and more than 800 events in the 2010s (Wirtz et al. 2014). Figure 3 shows 
that the number of geological disasters has not been much changed in the last 30 years 
compared to the number of hydro-meteorological and climatological events. 







Figure 3: Annual number of disasters associated with natural events from 1980 to 2013 
[Source: NatCat SERVICE, Munich Re, 2014]. 
 
3. Flood and other water related disaster in the world  
 
Since the dawn of civilization, destructive floods have jeopardized settlements located 
in river valleys and plains. Despite developments in technology and extensive 
investments in flood control works, flood occurrences and accompanying hardship and 
material damages are not decreasing significantly. Now, the global flood losses have 
grown worldwide to the level of billions of dollars per year. 
Trends in natural disasters show they are continually increasing in most regions of the 
world. Among all observed natural and anthropogenic adversities, water-related disasters 
are undoubtedly the most recurrent, and pose major impediments to achieving human 
security and sustainable socio-economic development, as recently witnessed with 
disasters such as the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, Cyclone 
Sidr in 2007, Cyclone Nargis in2008 and many others. During the period 2000 to 2006, 




2,163 water-related disasters were reported globally in the EM-DAT database, killing 
more than 290,000 people, afflicting more than 1.5billion people and inflicting more than 
US$422billion in damages (Yoganath Adikari and Junichi Yoshitani, 2009, ICHARM). 
Figure 4 shows the Global trends of water related disaster. Among all the water related 
disaster, flood is the most common disaster across the globe. 
 
 
Figure 4: Increase of flood events worldwide (OECD Japan, 2006) 
 
 
4. Disaster Concept  
 
The word “disaster” is a complicated (Quarantelli, 1985) and vague (Kreps, 1984, 
1985) concept. Establishing a clear conceptualization of an issue is important for public 
policy (Dynes & Drabek, 1994). For example, a clear understanding of the word 
disaster can provide guidance on the proper classification of particular historical events 
as disasters (Kreps, 1985). Proper categorization is vital in policymaking, such as in 




disaster declarations and dispatching resources for response and recovery. Similarly, in 
organizations, an unambiguous understanding of the definition of disasters has 
implications for decision-making. For instance, having a clear understanding of what 
constitutes disaster would enable organizations to know the appropriate mitigation and 
preparedness measures to adopt, e.g., whether or not to tie down business equipment. In 
addition, it is important to have a good definition of disasters in order to improve data 
gathering and analysis (Quarantelli, 2003), be able to generalize the findings of disaster 
research (Stallings, 2006), and advance theoretical understanding of disaster research 
(Quarantelli, 1985, 2003). The need for a clear conceptualization and definition of 
disaster is important in the disaster management literature that disaster researchers have 
spent much time on defining this concept (e.g., Kreps, 1984, 1985; Quarantelli, 1985, 
1987; Auf der Heide, 1989; Mileti, 1999; Perry, 2006; Gerber, 2007). Furthermore, the 
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters devoted an issue to 
discussing disasters in 1995 (Mileti, 1999). The question-what is a disaster?-Has 
received much attention from disaster researchers, especially after the publication of 
Quarantelli’s (1987) presidential address to the International Research Committee on 
Disasters. Before then, disaster researchers have generally avoided this topic 
(Quarantelli, 1985). Despite the attention and avoidance, there is no consensus on its 
definition and conceptualization (Quarantelli, 1985, 1987), to the extent that Quarantelli 
(1987) stated that disaster research might be at the threshold of a possible paradigmatic 
revolution. The following paragraph discusses some definitions of disasters to highlight 
the differences in meaning and conceptualization. According to Perry (2006), one can 
trace early definition of disaster to the work of Carr (1932). Carr defines disaster as the 
“collapse of cultural protections” (Carr, 1932 p 211). This perspective sees disasters as a 




negative consequence event, a view still in existence today (Perry, 2006). Fritz defines 
disasters as “…an event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society or a 
relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a society, undergoes severe danger and incurs 
such losses to its members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is 
disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the essential function of the society is 
prevented.” Cited in Quarantelli (1987 p 655).According to Mileti (1999), most people 
agreed with Fritz’s definition of disasters until recently when opinion began to diverge. 
The deviation has led to other definitions of disasters. For instance, Quarantelli (1985) 
views a disaster as an event in which the demand for action exceeds the capacity to 
respond. This perspective treats disasters as social “occasions” (Quarantelli, 1985 p 50). 
Nigg (1996) argues that social scientists define disaster based on social disruption and not 
on physical characteristics. She sees disasters occurring only “when the built and social 
environments are so disrupted that the resources of the social system are overwhelmed 
and the system is unable to meet the demands placed on it for goods and services that are 
routinely expected by its citizens” (Nigg, 1996 p 5). As a way forward, Quarantelli (1987) 
notes, among other suggestions, that having consensus on one definition of disaster is 
not important; clarity of the term and what the term refers to when the word is used are 
what is important. In the same vein, Perry (2006) recommends having a classification 
system that the disaster community can scrutinize with the goal of attaining some 
consensus (Perry, 2006). 
 
5. Disasters as “Human-made” or “Natural” 
 
There is a literature on disasters that focuses on the distinctions between natural and 
man-made/technological disasters (e.g., Quarantelli, 1987; Dynes & Drabek, 1994). 




Quarantelli (1987) provides a good historical account of disasters and traces the sources 
of disasters-to the stars, God, nature, men and women, and to society. The initial 
understanding of disasters was that they are “acts of God” (Dynes & Drabek, 1994 p 6). 
The occurrence of myriad natural disasters prompted many communities to see 
industrialization and technological advancements as solutions to the problems created 
by disasters (Ibid). For instance, communities built dams to address flooding caused by 
natural systems. Unfortunately, technological solutions led to increased development and 
subsequently more disasters (Ibid). This led to the realization that disasters may be 
“natural or technological” (Dynes & Drabek, 1994 p 7) / “acts of men” (Quarantelli, 1987 
p 9). I do not distinguish between natural or technological/man-made disasters because 
this study is about the determinants of mitigation and preparedness not about the causes 
of disasters. Although, some may argue that the causes of disasters can affect how 
organizations mitigate and prepare for them. In other words, some organizations may 
mitigate differently depending on whether a disaster is natural or man-made. This study 
assumes that the distinction between natural and man-made disasters is not relevant in 
understanding the determinants of mitigation and preparedness. 
 
6. Expected Losses from Disasters 
 
   Researchers have documented the pernicious nature of disasters (e.g., Auf de Heide, 
1989). The following examples highlight the monumental losses that can result from 
disasters. The Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989 caused 62 deaths, injured 3,757 people, 
displaced over 20,000 people, destroyed 18,306 homes and businesses, and caused over 
6 billion dollars in economic losses (Mileti & O’Brien, 1992). The estimate of economic 




losses from Hurricane Katrina is over $200 billion (Burby, 2006). The Midwest floods of 
June 2008 caused 24 fatalities, injuries to 150 people, destroyed 40,000 properties and 5 
million acres of agricultural land (Munich Reinsurance Group, 2008). While these costs 
vary by year, a new study by FEMA in 2006 indicates that the Annual Estimated Losses 
(AEL) to the national building stock are $5.3 billion (FEMA, 2007). In the first six months 
of 2008, the United States has suffered 154 fatalities and about $20.3 billion in estimated 
total losses to disasters (Munich Reinsurance Group, 2008). Evidence from the disaster 
literature (e.g., Mileti, 1999; Waugh, 2000) and the insurance community (e.g., Munich 
Reinsurance Group, 2008) suggest continued increases in losses from disasters. The 
reasons for the expected increases include, but not limited to rising population density, 
more settlements in high-risk areas, and increases in technological risks (Auf der Heide, 
1989).In 1995, more than 6,400 people died in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Also, 
in 2011, more than 18,000 people died or went missing due to the Great East Japan 





















Disasters in Japan 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, natural disasters occur frequently in Japan. Not only the large-scale 
low-frequency disaster like earthquakes or eruption, but also the small-scale high-
frequency disaster like landslides or flood occurs frequently accompanied by the guerrilla 
heavy rain or torrential rain. Japan is located in the Circum-Pacific Mobile Belt where 
seismic and volcanic activities occur constantly. Although the country covers only 0.25% 
of the land area on the planet, the number of earthquakes and active volcanoes is quite 
high. In addition, because of geographical, topographical and meteorological conditions, 
the country is subject to frequent natural disaster such as typhoons, torrential rains, floods 
and heavy snowfalls, as well as earthquakes and tsunami. 
 
2. The ratio of natural disasters in Japan to those in of the world (Earthquakes and 
Volcanoes) 
 
Among the countries of the world which suffer the most violent forces unleashed by 
nature, mention must unquestionably be made of Japan, with an abundant record of 
catastrophic events, produced on some occasions by earthquakes and on others by 
volcanoes, typhoons or tsunamis. 
In Japan, of all the damaged produced between 1955 and 2004 by natural disasters, 2% 
were due to flooding, 22% to wind and 76% to earthquakes (Kikugawa, H. and 
Bienkiewicz; 2005). Although Japan takes up only 0.25% of the earth’s surface area, it is 
the focus for a large percentage of the world’s earthquakes and volcanoes. 18.5% of 




earthquakes of magnitude 6 or more have occurred in Japan (2004-2013), where 7.1% of 
active volcanoes (2014) are also concentrated here (Disaster Management Cabinet Office, 













Figure 1: Number of earthquakes with magnitude of 6.0 or greater (2004-2013) 
 
 














Figure 3: Number of active volcanoes (2014) 
 
3. Deaths and missing persons caused by natural disaster in Japan 
 
Disasters cause death, economic and environmental damage, and severe setbacks for 
social development. As the 2011 Great Eastern Japan Earthquake has made all too clear, 
natural disasters can be very difficult to predict and fully prepare against, and have 
incredibly far-reaching consequences for the safety and wellbeing of individuals and 
communities. Japan is affected by earthquakes, typhoons and tsunamis. In addition to 
these natural disasters, Japan is also home to several volcanoes. 
Recent large-scale disasters, including the devastating earthquake and tsunami in Japan 
of March 2011, highlight the value of national preparedness for disaster. Figure 4 shows 
the number of deaths and missing persons caused by natural disasters (1945-2013). Figure 













Figure 4: The number of deaths and missing persons caused by natural disasters (1945-2013) 
[Source: 1945: Rika nenpyo, 1946～52: Japan Weather Disaster Annual Table, 1953～62: National 




Figure 5: The number of deaths and missing persons by type of disaster (Past 20years:1994-2013) 








Earthquakes, Tsunami Storm and Flood Disasters




Major Disaster: Mikawa Earthquake (2,306), Typhoon Makurazaki (3,756) 
 Major Disaster: Nankai Earthquake (1,443) 
 
Major Disaster: Typhoon Catherine (1,930) 
Major Disaster: Fukui Earthquake (3,769) 
Major Disaster: Torrential Rains (1,761) 
 
Major Disaster: Typhoon Toyamaru (1,124) 
 
Major Disaster: Typhoon Ise-wan (6,008) 
 
        Major Disaster: Great East Japan Earthquake (18,490) 
          
        








4. Disaster risk in Japan 
   
  Japan is a country that has been subjected to large-scale natural disasters periodically. 
Because of its natural conditions such as geographical position, topography, geology and 
climate, Japan is prone to be stricken by an earthquake, a typhoon, intensive rain, or 
volcanic eruption leading to disaster. Its climatic conditions, when combined with the 
country's rugged, steep mountainous topography particular to an island country, can 
sometimes lead to serious damage from intensive rain caused by a typhoon or a seasonal 
rain front, a flood or a landslide. Checking the distribution of seismic centers and 
volcanoes with a map of plate locations on the globe will reveal that places frequented by 
seismic activities coincide with plate borders. Japan is located right on the border of an 
oceanic plate and a terrestrial plate. Further, as it is surrounded by the sea, it is also 
vulnerable to tsunamis, which can also cause serious damage. In FY2003 alone, Japan 
recorded 2,179 sensible earthquakes and eruption of 4 volcanoes. In the future, it is also 
considered necessary to promote disaster-preventing measures from a national point of 
view, rather than to leave them to regional level efforts. 
  The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake (also known as the 2011 off the Pacific coast of 
Tohoku Earthquake) had a magnitude of 9.0 – the largest recorded in Japan since 
instrumental seismic observation began (JMA, 2013). The massive tsunami it generated 
hit Japanese coastal areas and caused severe damage, with the number of deaths and 
missing people reaching 18,490 (Fire and Disaster Management Agency, Japan). The 
myriad problems that resulted from the 2011 earthquake disaster exemplified the 
limitations of scientific understanding of the disaster itself, as well as the increasing 
vulnerabilities caused by current changes in japan social structures (Suzuki et al, 2015). 






Figure 6: The Great East Japan Earthquake (11 Mar. 2011)  
[Source: The Daily Asahi Shinbun File Photo] 
 
  On August 20, 2014, the landslide disaster occurred by the heavy rain at more than 166 
places in Asa-minami ward and Asa-kita ward of Hiroshima City, Japan. The serious 
damage caused by this heavy rain was 74 dead persons, 44 injured persons and 3,562 
material damages, etc. (Fire and Disaster Management Agency, 2014). 
Following torrential rain in which a month's worth fell in a single day, several landslides 
were triggered near a mountain beside the city of Hiroshima. Asakita-ku was the hardest-
hit ward. It received 217.5 millimeters (8.56 in) of rain from 1:30 am to 4:30 am causing 
two landslides which occurred between 4 am and 6 am. Hiroshima issued an evacuation 
advisory at 4:15 am. Figure 7 is the image that shows the Hiroshima landslide disaster on 
20th August, 2014. 
 
 






Figure 7: Hiroshima Landslide (20 Aug. 2014)  
[Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (2014)] 
 
  The Kinugawa River has burst through a flood barrier, sending a tsunami-like wall of 




Figure 8: Overflow of the Kinugawa River (10 Sep. 2015)  
[Source: Jiji Press/AFP/Getty Images]   




5. Large-scale flood disaster in Japan 
5.1 Geographical general context in Japan 
Japan has a geographic area of about 378 000 square kilometers, which is divided 
between four main islands. The country has a temperate climate, subject to extensive 
regional variation, with three periods of heavy precipitation. The country is exposed to a 
series of natural hazards –geo-seismic (earthquakes and volcanic activity, with the 
subsequent risk of tsunamis), as well as hydro-meteorological events – typhoons occur 
frequently in September and October. Floods are frequent events and have caused great 
damage in the past. The country is fairly mountainous, and rivers are relatively short and 
steep. With a population of 127 million, population density is very high. Most residential 
and industrial areas tend to be located in lowland areas, along rivers; these areas are highly 
flood-prone. According to a 1985 study, 48.7 percent of the population and 75 percent of 
holdings are located within flood-prone areas (MILT, Japan 2005).In the eastern part of 
the Greater Tokyo Area, several wards and cities find themselves below the water level 
of several rivers, most importantly the Arakawa and Edo Rivers. 
5.2 Experiences with floods 
Japan is exposed to all types of floods, in particular (definitions from Munich 
Reinsurance): 
Storm surge: Water pressed to shore (coast or large seas) by strong winds, which, 
when coinciding with the tide, can create a considerable rise in sea levels. 
River floods: Such floods are the result of heavy rainfall over several days and over 
large areas. The water level rises when the soil is saturated. 
Flash floods: Caused by intense rain over a small area. The soil is not saturated, but 
the rainfall exceeds the infiltration rate and runs off the surface. 




Tsunamis: waves generated by large volumes of water being displaced (by 
earthquakes, landslides or volcanic eruptions). Tsunamis can travel through the open sea 
for hundreds of kilometers without losing their energy and increase in height when they 
reach shore – up to ten meters.  
In Japan, risks related to tsunamis are, however, addressed as part of earthquake 
preparedness, and will therefore not be further considered in this paper. The worst 
flooding in modern Japanese history was caused by the Ise-wan typhoon in 1959, which 
took more than 5 000 lives. It occurred at the end of a period of twenty-five years of 
extreme climatic conditions: in the years between 1934 and 1959, there were six flood 
disasters, mainly caused by typhoons, which killed between 1 000 and 3 000 persons each. 
In recent years, there have been several flooding events in Japan, including the Tokai 
Heavy Rain in 2000, as well as several events in 2004 related to them any typhoons which 
hit the country, most notably the typhoons Songda and Tokage (see table 1). 
Table 1: Significant flooding disaster in Japan, 2000-2004 (JICE 2001, 2005) 
 





USD 990 million USD 7 billion 18
Fukui-Nigata-Fukushima





USD 1.95 billion 20 dead, 1 missing
Typhoone Songda/No. 18,
September 2004
Winds up to 212km/h,
torrential rain
USD 3.59 billion USD 7.17 billion 41dead, 4 missing
Typhoone Meari/No.21,
September 2004
Winds up to 160km/h,
rain, floods, landslides
USD 291 million USD 798 million 26 dead, 1 missing
Typhoone Ma-on/No.22,
October 2004
Winds up to 162km/h,
rain, floods,
USD 241 million USD 603 million 7 dead, 4 missing
Typhoone Tokage/No.23,
October 2004
Winds up to 229km/h,
23210 houses destroyed
USD 1.12 billion USD 3.2 billion 94 dead, 3 missing
Economic loss
Event Description Human loss




6. Flood and landslide disaster caused by heavy rainfall in Japan 
 
6.1 Heavy Rains and Floods in Japan  
The number of heavy rainfalls---over 100 millimeters per hour---doubled from 2.2 
times a year between 1976 to 1995 to 4.7 times a in the past decade. The concreting of 
rivers in municipalities has made flash floods very dangerous. Rain runs off into rivers 
quickly and builds up speed rapidly as there is no soil or vegetation to slow the water 
down.  
In 1938, 700 died or went missing in the Great Hanshin Flood that hit Kobe and 
surrounding areas. In July 1982, a flood in Nagasaki produced by 187 millimeters of rain 
in a single day killed nearly 300 people. Major landmarks such as the Megane bashi 
Bridge were washed away. The owner of a busy restaurant that was inundated with 2.2 
meters of water told the Yomiuri Shimbun, she heard a deep roar: “It was the sound of the 
river’s raging water, although I did not realize what it was. It was really scary.”  
In August 1999, 13 people who camped on an island in the Kurokauragawa River in 
Kanagawa Prefecture were swept away and killed after torrential rains caused the river to 
quickly rise and cover the island. Five people on the island were rescued. The campers 
had been warned that the river was going to flood but didn't respond.  
In July 2003, landslides and floods triggered by torrential rains during the summer 
rainy season left 22 dead in Kyushu. Damage around the city of Minamata was the worst. 
Hundreds of troops and firefighters were employed in a search for missing people. The 
same storm, which dropped up to four inches of rain an hour is some places, derailed a 
train in Nagasaki and flooded subways stations in Fukuoka. 
On 13 July 2004, torrential rains fell over the Chuetsu region of the Niigata Prefecture 




that were remarkable for the total rainfall and the amount of rainfall within a relatively 
short period of time that triggered hundreds of landslide events-collapsing hillsides, 
mudslides, and debris-and in the alluvial lowlands, the Ikarashi, the Kariyata, and other 
small to medium-sized rivers feedinginto the Shinano River broke through their levees. 
Large-scale flooding devastated Sanjo City, Mitsuke City, and Nakanoshima Town where 
16 people died, 2,500 hectares of land were inundated, 29 homes completely destroyed, 
158 homes partly destroyed, 13,289 homes with major water damage, and6, 199 other 
buildings severely damaged. This disaster is referred to as the Niigata flood of 2004. 
Figure 9 shows the terrible situation of Nigata flood. 
 
 
Figure 9: Flood water flowing into the housing area from the bank of the Kariyata River (NIED, 2006)  
6.2 Heavy Rains in 2008, 2009 and 2010 in Japan  
   Heavy rains in August 2008, caused severe damage, particularly in Aichi Prefecture, 
and generated floods and landslides in several locations around Nagoya and Tokyo. New 
hourly precipitation records were set in 32 locations.  
Rainfall in Okazaki in Aichi Prefecture reached 148 millimeters per hour, the seventh 




highest on record. In Tokyo itself more than 700homes were flooded. Two people were 
killed: an 80-year-old swept away by a swollen river in Okazaki and a 73-year-old woman 
who died when her flooded house. The body of the 80-year-old woman was found 40 
kilometers from her home.  
Waters in Okazaki reached waist-level. Some train lines were flooded, causing 
passengers to spend the night in the trains. The rain came from storms caused by warm 
humid air over particularly warm water channeled toward the Nagoya and Tokyo area 
between stalled high- and low- pressure systems off the coast of eastern Japan.  
The heavy rains were attributed to “snaking westerlies”---winds that undulate north 
and south like a snake while moving towards the east---as opposed to the normal west-
to-east westerly winds. The snaking pattern was caused by the movement of a large high 
pressure cell which usually sits over Japan in the summer to the Pacific off of Japan. This 
caused a front to form over Japan on which cold air from Russia slammed into warm and 
moist air from the south, producing heavy rains. The same pattern brought rains to Beijing 
for the Olympics.  
In July 2009, ten people were killed in Fukuoka Prefecture in northern Kyushu in 
floods, mudslides and landslides caused by heavy rains. The dead were swept away by 
rain-swollen rivers and swallowed up in mudslides that engulfed their homes. A large 
landslide blocked the Kyushu Expressways. Some places received more than 600 
millimeters of rain in less than 24 hours. Around the same time, 16 people were killed in 
Yamaguchi Prefecture, many of them elderly people killed when a mudslide inundated a 
nursing home.  
Heavy rains during the summer rainy season in 2010 caused some severe damage and 
killed several people. One bout of intense rain in mid-July killed 13 people in Gifu, 




Hiroshima and Shimane Prefecture. Some of the victims were swept away by swollen 
rivers. Others were in homes engulfed by mudslides. Two victims were killed in a house 
in Matsue struck by four-meter-wide boulders.  
Heavy rains in October 2010 on the Amami Island killed three people, downed power 
lines and caused landslides. More than 2,000 people were cut off by landslides and floods. 
Large amounts of mud that ran off into the ocean, smothering and killing coral.  
 
6.3 Heavy Rain in Niigata and Fukushima in July 2011  
In July 2011, a 67-year-old man was found dead and five people were missing 30 as 
torrential rains hammered Niigata and Fukushima prefectures, the Asahi Shimbun 
reported. The Niigata Prefectural Police Department said the man had apparently been 
driving home from a hospital on the night of July 29, when his car was swept into a river 
in Tokamachi. His body was found the next morning about 1.8 kilometers downstream.  
Four others were missing in Niigata Prefecture, including a 63-year-old man who is 
believed to have drowned while he was stacking sandbags along a river bank in Ojiya. 
Embankments broke on the Aburumagawa and Hanegawa rivers in Uonuma, the 
Ikarashigawa River in Sanjo, and the Chagogawa River in Ojiya and the Makikawa River 
in Gosen. The Uonogawa and Kariyatagawa rivers in Nagaoka also broke their banks.  
About 365,000 people in 15 municipalities, including Sanjo, Niigata and Nagaoka, 
were advised to evacuate. There was also extensive damage in Fukushima Prefecture, 
with communities left isolated by landslides and damaged bridges. A total of 711.5 
millimeters of rain was recorded at Tadamimachi in Fukushima Prefecture.  
On July 29, the rainfall sets all-time records, with an hourly precipitation of up to 
121.0 millimeters recorded in some locations. According to the Meteorological Agency, 




the precipitation was heavier than rains that hit the two prefectures in 2004, killing 15. 
Hourly rainfall on July 29 hit 93.5 millimeters in Kamo, Niigata Prefecture, 121.0 
millimeters in Tokamachi, Niigata Prefecture, and 69.5 millimeters in Tadami, Fukushima 
Prefecture, setting record highs at those stations. July 30 brought more record downpours 
in Niigata Prefecture, with 89.5 millimeters recorded in Minami-Uonuma, 70.0 
millimeters in Uonuma, 68.0 millimeters in Nagaoka and 58.0 millimeters in Joetsu 
(Asahi Shimun, 2011).  
6.4 Heavy Rain in 2012, Twenty-five Dead in Kyushu 
In July 2012, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported: “Torrential rains caused by a seasonal 
rain front have brought death and destruction to the nation, mainly in western Japan. A 
number of people have been killed or are missing. The victims were crushed in their 
homes by mudslides or swept away by rain-swollen rivers. During the past month, there 
have been over 350 reported landslides. In Matsue, a mudslide on a slope behind a private 
house caused two huge rocks, each measuring four meters in diameter, to strike the 
building, killing two residents. In Yaotsucho, Gifu Prefecture, a mudslide crushed a 
private house, killing three residents. On July 5 this year, an intense rainfall of 107 
millimeters per hour was recorded in Tokyo's Itabashi Ward. 
In July 2011, 25 people were confirmed dead as a result of torrential rains, flooding, 
landslides and mudslides caused by a strong seasonal rain front in Kumamoto, Fukuoka 
and Oita Prefectures in northern Kyushu, according to police. Seven people were missing. 
More than 240,000 people were advised to evacuate their homes.  
  In Yame, Fukuoka Prefecture, Yame Police Station confirmed the death of Katsutoshi 
Matsumoto, a 70-year-old farmer. Matsumoto was engulfed in a mudslide and was found 
in cardio-respiratory arrest. In the city of Yanagawa, Masayuki Kawaryu, a 28-year-old 




unemployed man from Miyama in the prefecture, was found near a car that fell into a 
ditch. According to Yanagawa Police Station, the ditch was used for farming and 
measured about 24 meters wide and three meters deep. He was later confirmed to have 
drowned. Earlier a passerby witnessed the car falling into the ditch. But the car 
immediately sank in the water and rescuers could not find it on that day. In Taketa, Oita 
Prefecture, a 74-year-old man died in a flooded river.  
  In Oita Prefecture, the Yamakunigawa River in Nakatsu and the Kagetsugawa River in 
Hita overflowed. In Hita, an evacuation advisory was given to 33,700 people in 12,000 
households. In Fukuoka Prefecture, 190,000 members of 66,000 households across a wide 
area were advised to evacuate. A similar advisory was issued to about 16,500 people from 
6,000 households in the city of Saga.  
 In northern Kyushu, rainfall of 90 millimeters in one hour was registered in the town 
of Soeda, Fukuoka Prefecture, at about 5:30 a.m. and 85 millimeters was recorded in Hita 
at about 7:15 a.m Record-setting hourly rainfalls of 110 millimeters were recorded near 
Yame and Chikugo in Fukuoka Prefecture around 9:30 a.m. In the three days up to 11:20 
a.m., the cumulative rainfall was about 780 millimeters in Aso, Kumamoto Prefecture, 
650 millimeters in Yame and 600 millimeters in Hita.  
  In Aso, Kumamoto Prefecture, 17 people have been found dead, while five others are 
still missing. In nearby Minami-Aso, a 26-year-old man was found dead in his collapsed 
house. An 81-year-old woman had not returned to an evacuation center after leaving for 
her home in Takamori, Kumamoto Prefecture. Jiji Press reported: According to the 
Japanese Meteorological agency, 108 millimeters of rainfall per hour was recorded 
shortly before 6 a.m. on July 12 in the city of Aso, Kumamoto Prefecture, which saw a 
cumulative rainfall of 507.5 millimeters in the 24 hours to noon. According to the 




Kumamoto prefectural police headquarters, many houses collapsed due to landslides in 
Aso. Nine people were confirmed dead in the city. In Aso and the neighboring village of 
Minami-Aso, the whereabouts of at least 10 people were unknown (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
2012) 
6.5 Landslides, Other Dangers Associated with Heavy Summer Rains in Japan 
A phenomenon that is said to call ‘guerrilla rain ‘sudden downpours into relatively 
narrow zones, mainly in urban areas---has attracted attention in recent years. Such kind 
of rain is caused mainly by cumulonimbus clouds that form in a clash of warm and cold 
air. But some experts think the urban heat island phenomenon and global warming trends 
have a causal relationship to the sudden downpours. Guerrilla rain is frightening in that it 
is difficult to predict and the damage it causes occurs all at once. In the summer of 2008, 
five workers died in Tokyo after being washed away by a surge in sewer water while 
working underground. Also that summer, a swollen river killed five people, including 
primary school children, in Kobe.  
  There are also landslides. In recent years, experts have attributed large-scale mudslides 
to the so-called deep-seated landslide mechanism. Heavy rain soaks into cracks in the 
bedrock, which has been weakened over time, and when the bedrock collapses downhill, 
it takes a large volume of upper soil with it. Unlike shallow landslides, which can be 
prevented to a certain degree through good forestry practices, there are no known 
measures to prevent the occurrence of deep-seated landslides. We consider it necessary 
to urgently study what steps could be taken.  
About 200 people are killed every year in Japan in rain-related disasters. A flash flood 
caused a storm that dropped 23 millimeters of rain in a short period of time produced a 
flash flood that killed four people in Kobe in July 2008. Three of the victims---an adult 




and two children---were members of school group playing on the banks of the Togagawa 
River when the flash flood struck. Others were swept away and rescued. The Togagawa 
River in Kobe is lined with concrete. Water levels in the river rose 134 centimeters in 10 
minutes.  
In July 2007, heavy rains associated with the seasonal rain front caused landslides and 
river flooding in Kyushu. One train was derailed by a landslide of mud and trees. No 
serious injuries were reported. In July 2006, mudslides caused by heavy rains associated 
with the rainy season killed 20 people in Nagano, Fukui, Shimane and Okayama 
prefectures and forced an evacuation of almost 15,000 people from 5,322 homes. Three 
people were killed when a flash flood washed away their home. Landslides and mudslides 
swallowed up and carried away homes. A levee broke in one place. Rain in some places 
was over 500 centimeters over several days. Some places received four centimeters of 
rain an hour. One place in Nagano Prefecture received 61.3 centimeters of rain (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 2010). Table 2 shows the fatalities number because of the rainfall disaster in 
Japan for only three consecutive years e.g. from July 2005 to July 2007. 














Heavy rainfall due to stationary front in July 2007 4
Heavy rainfall due to stationary front in July 2005 
Typhoon No.0514
Hazard
Heavy rainfall due to stationary front in July 2006 
Typhoon No.0613




7. Trend of increasing frequency of torrential heavy rainfall in Japan 
 
  Many climatological studies have shown that there has been a positive trend in heavy 
rainfall events over the past 100 years (e.g. Iwashima and Yamamoto, 1993; Karl and 
Knight, 1998; New et al., 2001; Groisman et al., 2005; Fujibe et al., 2006a and 2006b). 
According to analyses by the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) (2009) and Fujibe et 
al. (2005) that were conducted using observational data, there is no doubt that there has 
been a recent increase in the frequency of heavy rainfall over most of Japan. However, 
no sufficiently comprehensive studies based on observational data have yet been 
conducted to elucidate the mechanism for this positive trend in heavy rainfall (Hiroyuki 
Iwasaki, 2011). In Japan, the trend of increasing frequency of heavy rain is expected to 
continue. Both hourly and daily rainfall tends to increase. As a result, sometimes this 
leads to a flash flood in the localities. The figure 10 shows the annual frequency of 100 
mm/hour or more precipitation events (per 1,000 localities)  
 
Figure 10: The annual frequency of 100 mm/hour or more precipitation events per 1,000 localities 















































Figure 11 shows also the increasing frequency of heavy rain in Japan. It is evident from 




Figure 11: The annual frequency of 50 mm/hour or more precipitation events per 1,000 localities 
(Data source: MILT, Japan. 2009) 
 
8. Natural disasters caused by heavy rainfall 
 
Rainfall disaster have been deeply noticed since the ancient age of the human being. In 
spite of the development of modern technology the problems related to them are not yet 
solved today (K. Takeo, 1994). 
Heavy rainfall can lead to numerous hazards, for example: 
 Flooding, including risk to human life, damage to buildings and infrastructure, 













































 Landslides, which can threaten human life, disrupt transport and communications, 
and cause damage to buildings and infrastructure. 
 Soil erosion, Soil erosion is a process that affects all landforms. In agriculture, 
soil erosion refers to the wearing a way of a field's topsoil by the natural physical 
forces of water and wind or through forces associated with farming activities such 
as tillage. 
Figure 12: Natural disaster caused by heavy rainfall 
Sources of images (Figure 12) 
Flood image: Aerial view-Flooding in Kyushu Island, Japan (http://www.disaster-
report.com/2012/07/natural-disasters-list-july-14-2012.html) 
Landslides image: An aerial view of houses and roads devastated by a major landslide in 
Asaminami-ku, Hiroshima, western Japan, on 20 August 2014. EPA/HIROTO 
NOMOTO/YOMIURI SHIMBUN/Soil erosion image: Road collapsed due to soil 
erosion after heavy rain. (http://www.theborneopost.com/2013/01/24) 
Flod Landslides SoilErosion
Infrastructure damage and Human damage 




9. The classifications of rains 
 
The classification of rains by the Japan Meteorological Agency, the Ministry of Land, and 
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism and other relevant organizations is shown in Table 
3.  
















Continuous for several days
Sudden Showers Localized Heavy Rain Concentrated Torrential Rain
Heavy Rain Arising from a Typhoon,
front, or other weather phenomenon_
Characteristics
Occurs suddenly
and stops in a
short time





Formation and development of
a cumulonimbus
Repeated cycle of the formation and
development of a cumulonimbus at
the same location







area and concentrated in a
short time)
Several hundreds of




Difficult to predict, for the
time being
Relatively easy to predict Relatively easy to predict
Toshima City, Tokyo(August
5, 2008) Torrential rainfall :






The rain commonly known as the Tokai
Torrential Rain ( September 2000) [
daily rainfall in Nagoya city: 567mm]
The Nigata-Fukushima Torrential Rain
(July 2004) [Total rainfall in Tochio City:
431mm]
SuginamiCity,Tokyo(September 4,
2005) Total rainfall: 264mm; Largest
hourly rainfall: 114mm; Rainfall
duration: approx. 4 hours
Kanazawa City (Jly 28, 2008) Total
rainfall: 142mm; Largest hourly
rainfall: 60mm; Rainfall duration:
approx. 3 to 4 hours





Objective and Methodology of the Research 
 
1. Objective of the Research 
   Based on the lessons learned from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, the 
emergency transport road is set for smooth emergency transport immediately after the 
earthquake for a high-speed automobile for national highway, the general highway and 
the trunk road which is designated by the prefectures to contact mutually between the 
disaster prevention bases. The emergency transport road (ETR) is categorized of primary, 
secondary and tertiary type for each prefecture. It is seen a little difference in the name 
and selection criteria, but basically the primary road covers the wide area range of high-
speed automobile national highway, the general national highway and the trunk road. 
Then it shapes such a way that secondary and tertiary road can connect with primary road 
and also can communicate mutually between the disaster prevention bases as well as with 
the government offices. 
During the Kobe earthquake (Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake) that occurred in January 
17, 1995. The earthquake damaged the elevated structure, such as a highway, railway, 
blocked of road surface by the collapsed of roadside building, the capacity of the affected 
areas was significantly reduced. In addition, the traffic demand was different than of 
normal or ordinary time because of the evacuation activities after the accident occurred, 
emergency and rescue activities, relief activities, in relation to the recovery and 
reconstruction activities, etc. From the fact that the main trunk line which is responsible 
for Japan's east-west traffic were damaged, the next day of disaster occurred e.g. on the 
18th January, emergency transportation route 2 of the east-west has been set to compensate 
for the damage situation. However, to regulate the passage only by the emergency vehicle 




was actually difficult. The above-mentioned contents are shown as a collection of 
Hanshin Awaji great earthquake disaster lesson information book in conjunction with the 
emergency transportation by the road traffic by the Cabinet Office As it has also been 
mentioned in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake lesson information book, road 
blockage caused by a roadside building collapse during the earthquake, that it can be 
assumed that the roads were impassible. In addition, such as flood damage on the road by 
the river flooding or building collapsed on the road by an earthquake is assumed not to 
be able to pass by traffics. There have been accomplished a lot of researches accomplished 
in respect of general road blockages due to collapse of the roadside building so far (Kondo 
et al., 2010; Ichikawa et al., 2004; Tamura et al., 2005). On the other hand, study and of 
the road section that may become impassable due to a disaster, consider between certain 
two points, or connectivity that is impassable interval is guaranteed even in the event, or 
the arrival delay, such as how much arrival delay occurs, it is important from the point of 
view of emergency transport in the event of a disaster, but it is the present condition that 
such a study has not done sufficiently. Therefore, in this study, we analyzed the emergency 
transportation at the time of the river flooding, at the time of the earthquake using the 
emergency transportation route and analyze the section that might be flooded by the 
flooding, the section that it might block up by the collapse of the building of the 
emergency transportation roads. Based on the result, we analyzed it by network analysis 
about the reachability between prefectural offices and municipal offices e.g. city, town 
and village offices. 
   An emergency transportation road network is designated for a large-scale seismic 
hazard, and a network is maintained so that it may become possible to do smooth 
transportation of goods when a large-scale disaster happens in Japan. However, while 




frequency and the kind of accidents are diverse, emergency transportation roads are not 
quantitatively grasped how degree have a disaster risk. In this study, the risk of emergency 
transportation road network were quantitatively evaluated considering the various 
hazards such as earthquakes, floods, landslides, tsunami, volcanic and storm surges. 
     Therefore, in this study, we analyzed firstly, the risk of emergency transportation 
road network were quantitatively evaluated considering the various hazards such as 
earthquakes, floods, landslides, tsunami, volcanic and storm surges. 
     Secondly, we analyzed the emergency transportation at the time of the river 
flooding, at the time of the earthquake using the emergency transportation route and 
analyze the section that might be flooded by the flooding, the section that it might block 
up by the collapse of the building of the emergency transportation roads. Based on the 
result, we analyzed it by network analysis about the reachability between prefectural 
offices and municipal offices e.g. city, town and village offices. 
Thirdly, as a case study of a large-scale river disaster, it is analyzed the actual situation 
and evacuation behavior of a large scale flood disaster e.g. Asanogawa flood 2008. 
 
2. Methodology of the Research 
 
2.1 Evaluation of Emergency Transportation Road Network to Various Hazards in 
Japan 
   As a disaster in Japan, it can be mentioned the name of the earthquake, flood, tsunami, 
high tide and volcano. For the earthquake hazard assessment, the probability is equal to 
or greater than 5 of the seismic intensity in 30 years, has been assessed by the measured 
seismic intensity that becomes each exceedance probability of 30-50 years (J-SHIS: Japan 




seismic hazard information station (in Japanese).For the flood hazard assessment, we 
used the data relating to flood provided by the county, prefectures or metropolitan that is 
evaluated as a boundary at 3.0m,0.5m with 3 phases (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, 
Transport and Tourism: Guidance of Flood Hazard Mapping). In addition, 5.0m is added 
to the border when flood levels exceeding 5.0m, then it is widely distributed with the 
boundary at 5.0m.The relationship between the boundary height and the happening 
phenomenon is for 0.5m, flooded above 1stfloor level of the building; for 3.0m flooded 
2nd floor surface of the building; for 5.0m, 2ndfloor is submerged with water and there is 
possibility of 3rdfloor surface is flooded. For the tsunami and high tide, as it varies 
according to the areas, we examine a rational external force level depending on a local 
characteristic and on the basis of condition setting in table1, chapter 4(Japan 
Meteorological Agency: About active volcano). About the volcano, the risk is evaluated 
by the total number of Japan's active volcano with the proportion of the existing volcanic 
hazard map. The total number of Japan's active volcano is 110, of which, the number of 
hazard map that has been published is 82. 
  The total number of the active volcano of our Japan is 110 and the number of hazard 
map which is officially published is 82 (Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and 
Tourism: Hazard map portal site).Therefore, the risk of the volcano is estimated to be 
74.5%. 
 
2.2 Reachability Analysis of Emergency Transportation Road between Prefectural 
Office and Municipal Offices  
 
In this study, we use the emergency transportation roads of the national numerical land 
information data. These data is to create a route shape, division of the emergency 




transportation road, road classification, a route name using a local disaster prevention 
plan, the documentation about the emergency transportation road network plan which are 
organized by the metropolis and districts. 
As one of the factors that emergency transportation road becomes unusable, it can be 
considered flood damage. In this study in order to assess the flood damage of ETR, it has 
been received the use of anticipated flooding zone data of the country numerical 
information inundation assumption area and assumed inundation depth at the national 
scale. Bedside the flooding assumption, in this data it is organized the immersion depth 
of the river and data plan rainfall of the object such as underlying the specified inundation 
assumption area. Inundation is divided into 5 or 7 level shown in table 2 of chapter 5.The 
situation where the road becomes unusable by flooding, in this study it is defined as the 
depth of immersion; car becomes impossible of traveling. Generally, depth immersion of 
the automobile is unable traveling are the depth of the floor of the vehicle are flooded. 
Therefore, of the Table 2 of chapter 5, to evaluate as a section that emergency 
transportation road inundation depth to exist in inundation assumed within the area that 
fall into more than 0.5m may become unusable by flooding when the rivers flood. In 
addition, the flood zone of emergency transportation road, as shown in Figure 1 of chapter 
5, the emergency transport roads and inundation assumption area data of the country 
numerical information when it is piled up on a GIS, both of interval were completely 
matched. 
Another factor that emergency transportation road becomes unusable, it is thought that 
buildings along the roadside comes to collapse on emergency transportation road at the 
time of the earthquake. To evaluate the risk of a road obstruction by buildings collapsed, 
it is required the data of the position and height of building, construction time and about 




structure of the building, etc. Such kind of data is what is readily available with a limited 
amount of information, if further directed to a wide range of area as in this study, the 
data’s availability is almost nil. Therefore, we tried to make the data available to 
understand the height and position of the building in the present study. We were using the 
data creation of a detailed map 201 214 provided by the ESRI Japan. This data is a 
background map database that has been developed by processing and map data of the 
ZENRIN Co., Ltd., and base map information and national land numerical information 
of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. That is, a variety of information on 
the map data of the individual. The data about the desired building are included in this 
study in that, and a kind and the height of the building are compiled into a database. 
Incidentally, the height of the building has been considered by one floor per 3m, the type 
of buildings are uniquely classified. Such data can take advantage of the position and 
height as possible grasp the building data. It shows the data of the above example in figure 
2 of chapter 5. 
 However, in order to consider the building collapse due to earthquake, is further 
necessary structural form of the building and their ages. The structure type of the building, 
were classified as wooden and non-wooden as shown in Table 3; chapter 5 according to 
the classification of the data. The building of classification that are assigned to the 
residence was a wooden, but also includes high-rise dwellings, such as apartment in this 
classification. For this reason, the fourth floor or more of the building (building height is 
more than 9m) it was classified as non-wooden. From the fact that information is 
insufficient with respect to building age, it is assumed that all in the present study is a 
building that was built with the latest building standards. By this assumption, its results 
for the building collapse indicated by this study and it will be a minimum damage 




estimation of the case. Building data created in the above steps, in State buildings to not 
pull all the data. Therefore, and in areas along emergency transport roads for, and to 
extract only the data affect the obstruction of emergency transportation roads to collapsed 
buildings. If the evaluation or a building affect the emergency transportation road when 
collapsed is performed based on the positional relationship between the height and the 
emergency transportation of this building. It shows the extraction flow diagram of the 
building that affect the emergency transportation road in Figure 3; chapter 5. Extraction 
of the building, to determine the center of gravity of the building, from the center of 
gravity obtained, after drawing a circle to the height of the building as a radius, affects 
the emergency transportation roads the building when including emergency transportation 
roads within the circle. It performed in the procedure that is extracted as a given building. 
For buildings along emergency transport roads we created in this step, J-SHIS earthquake 
hazard stations are exposed by earthquake motion estimation map (fig. 7; chapter 5), to 
determine if there is a possibility of suffering from the shaking intensity of the extent to 
which expected seismic area grid. 
By performing extraction and assumed measurement seismic intensity determination 
data creation and data necessary as described above, data for evaluating the risk of 
clogging the emergency transportation roads by building collapse caused by an 
earthquake are aligned. In order to evaluate the risk, for these data, it applies the damage 
function of the building due to an earthquake, to determine the total collapse probability 
of each building. Then the random simulation, it is determined whether or not the building 
is destroyed, if it is destroyed is evaluated and the building road blockage occurs in the 
emergency transportation roads adjacent. 
 






Vulnerability of Emergency Transportation Road Network to Various 
Hazards in Japan 
 
 
  In Japan, a natural disaster occurs frequently in recent years. An emergency 
transportation road network is designated for a large-scale seismic hazard, and a network 
is maintained so that it may become possible to do smooth transportation of goods when 
a large-scale disaster happens in Japan. However, while frequency and the kind of 
accidents are diverse, emergency transportation roads are not quantitatively grasped how 
degree have a disaster risk. In this study, the risk of emergency transportation road 
network were quantitatively evaluated considering the various hazards such as 
earthquakes, floods, landslides, tsunami, volcanic and storm surges. As a result, currently 
disaster risk of the road that is designated the emergency transportation road network is 
high, and the emergency transportation road network does some disaster, and it became 
clear to be impassable in the case of floods, landslides, and volcanic disaster. In addition, 
emergency transportation road network at the time of Tokai, Tonankai and Nankai 
earthquakes it became clear the risk is high to be impassable. The further study, the 
possibility of emergency transportation road network can be connected disaster 
prevention shelter base. 
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, natural disasters occur frequently in Japan. Not only the large-scale 
low-frequency disaster like earthquakes or eruption, but also the small-scale high-
frequency disaster likes landslides or flood occurs frequently accompanied by the 




guerrilla heavy rain or torrential rain. For such a situation, the designation of the 
emergency transportation road is accomplished for a large-scale earthquake disaster in 
Japan. 
  The network of designated road is maintained to become able to transport smooth 
supplies at the time of a large-scale disaster, but there are few studies that evaluate how 
the degree of disaster risk can be controlled by the emergency transportation road while 
the type and frequency of the disaster diversify quantitatively. And again, it is the present 
conditions that it does not perform the evaluation that assumed a complex disaster. 
In this study, it is intended to evaluate quantitatively the risk of emergency transportation 
roads that is hit by various hazards such as earthquakes, floods, landslides, tsunami, 
volcanic and high tide, and we also conducted an analysis of the disaster risk of 
emergency transportation roads. In this study, we will describe the risk of emergency 
transport roads to various hazards such as earthquakes, landslides and flooding. 
2. Hazard Assessment in this study 
Whenever disasters in Japan are mentioned, the name of an earthquake, flood, or 
volcano comes to mind. The evaluation index of various hazards is shown in table 1. 
Table 1: The evaluation index of various hazards 
 
 
   
地震 浸水
30 年間で震度 5 弱以上となる確率 0.5m 未満 外力レベル1 養殖施設等に影響する津波(地上に影響 しない)
30 年間で震度 5 強以上となる確率 0.5～3.0m 未満 外力レベル２ 設計外力(既往最大津波)
30 年間で震度 6 弱以上となる確率 3.0m 以上 外力レベル３ 想定最大津波(想定地震規模、最悪震源 位置)












外力レベル１ 発生頻度の高い高潮 ①火山ハザードマップ公表数 82（インターネット公開：58）
外力レベル２ 設計外力(既往最大又は想定最大[既往 最大規模・最悪進路]) ②わが国の活火山の総数 110
外力レベル３ 想定最大高潮(わが国既往最大規模・最 悪進路) ①÷②×100 82÷110×100=74.5
火山高潮




   For earthquake hazard assessment, the probability of an earthquake with a seismic 
intensity equal to or greater than 5 has been assessed using the measured seismic intensity 
in the past, and has been found to be increasing since the last 30–50 years. Here, Seismic 
intensity is the index which shows the strength of the earthquake ground motion. The 
seismic intensity is ranged from greater than 0.5 to 4.5 is 1cut and from less than 4.5 to 
greater than 6.5 is divided into 10 stages of 0.5 cut. 
For the hazard assessment of floods, the data provided is sorted by county, prefectures, 
and metropolitan cities, and is evaluated with a flood boundary of 3.0 m and 0.5 m with 
three phases. In addition, 5.0 m is added to the border when the flood levels begin 
exceeding 5.0 m, then it is widely distributed with the boundary at 5.0 m. The relationship 
between the boundary height and the flooding phenomenon is given by the following: at 
0.5 m, flooding occurs in the first floor of the building; at 3.0 m, flooding occurs in the 
second floor of the building; at 5.0 m, the second floor is submerged with water, and there 
is a possibility that the third floor might also be flooded. 
  For volcanos, the risk is calculated by dividing the total number of active volcanos in 
Japan with the proportion of the existing volcanic hazard map. Presently, the total number 
of active volcanos in Japan is 110, and the number of hazard maps which have been 
officially published is 82. Therefore, the risk of the volcano is estimated to be 74.5%. 
 
3. Emergency transportation road in Japan 
 
Based on the lessons learned from the Great Hanshin–Awaji Earthquake, the 
emergency transport road network is set up to provide seamless emergency transportation 
immediately after an earthquake for a high-speed automobile national highway, the 




general national highway and the trunk road which is designated by the governor to enable 
mutual contact between the disaster prevention bases. Emergency transportation road has 
been promoting the strengthening of the planned network for secure and emergency 
transportation, including the regional disaster prevention plans for each prefecture as the 
rapid relief activities of the road closures, etc., such as impassable was seen many areas 
that require a long period of time.  
  The emergency transportation road is categorized as the primary road for each 
prefecture. There is a little difference in the name and selection criteria, but basically the 
primary road covers a wide range of area of the national highway, highway, and the trunk 
road. It is also shaped in such a way that secondary and tertiary roads can connect with 
the primary road and enable mutual communication with disaster prevention bases and 
government offices. Table 2 shows the total length of each specified rank of emergency 
transportation road and Figure 1 shows the road network diagram of emergency 
transportation road. The emergency transportation roads have occupied a high percentage 
of the national highway for high-speed automobiles and the general national highway, as 
well as the total extension accounts for a high ratio. Therefore, it is believed that enough 
of the wide area has been secured via the emergency transportation roads. 
    







































4. Analysis of disaster risk of the emergency transportation road 
 
4.1 The disaster risk due to earthquake 
  The disaster potential of the emergency transportation roads was analyzed for 
earthquakes, floods, and landslides. For an earthquake, the results of the analysis of these 
roads were overlapped within the predicted seismic intensity distribution.  




   Emergency transport roads were overlapped in each evaluation criteria listed in figure 
2, where ① –④ denotes a hit probability by earthquake on the emergency transportation 
road is divided by color into 10 stages at the range of 0 to 1 about each of seismic intensity 
a little less than 5, a little more than 5, a little less than 6 and a little more than 6. ⑤ –⑩ 
are  divided by color into 6 stages of seismic intensity less than 4.5 to more than 6.5 
about the hit assumption on the emergency transportation road with exceedance 
probability of 30 years and 50 years. In any case, the Pacific side showed a dangerously 
high value of risk, and, at every measurement of seismic intensity, it is added to the Pacific 
side again, and even the Itoigawa–Shizuoka tectonic line was found to possess a large 
disaster risk in ③. In case of the probability of the occurrence of an earthquake with a 
seismic intensity less than 6, it is observed that the risk of the Kanto region is large, 
followed by Tokai. The risk of a capital earthquake directly above the focus in addition 





















Figure 2: Disaster risk of emergency transportation road viewed with different predicted seismic intensity 




4.2 The disaster risk due to landslides 
For landslides, the overlap ratio of the emergency transportation roads and landslide 
danger zone was analyzed to determine the disaster risk in every metropolis and district. 
In addition, the overlap ratio was given by: (the extension of the emergency transport 
roads are duplicated in each hazard area) / (total extension of emergency transportation 
road). The disaster risk for each portion of an avalanche such as debris flow, steep slope 
place collapse, and landslide was also studied. Furthermore, the aggregate result of the 
primary road alone has been described in this paper. Figure 3 shows a graph that plots the 
overlap ratio for each item on the primary road. 
 
 
Figure 3: Overlap ratio of landslide disaster and emergency transportation road (primary road) 




From Figure 3, it can be observed that the overlap ratios in the Chubu, Chugoku, and 
Shikoku districts were distinctly larger. Additionally, it can be noted that the Nagano 
prefecture has the highest ratio of debris flow compared to other prefectures. When 
comparing the highest values of each factor among different prefectures, it is revealed 
that the debris flow in the Nagano prefecture, steep slope collapse in the Yamaguchi 
prefecture, landslides in the Tokushima prefecture, and avalanche in the Gifu prefecture 
has resulted in most overlap. The analysis of the overlap ratio for each item for the 
secondary road can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4. Overlap ratio of landslide disaster and emergency transportation road (secondary road) 




  The secondary road does not show a large difference in values when compared to each 
item of the primary road. While the risk of avalanche or landslide seems to have increased, 
the overall risk of each item has increased only slightly in most of the metropolitan cities 
and districts. The latter has a higher percentage of prefectural and municipal roads when 
compared to the former, and the reason behind the increasing percentage is that the roads 
chosen here are mountainous in nature. Additionally, it must be considered that the width 
of mountainous roads is smaller and slanted lines are lesser in number when compared to 
the roads in the city. For these reasons, there is a high risk of the road becoming 
impassable to traffic because of a landslide. Figure 5 shows a graph analyzing the overlap 
ratio for each item for the tertiary road. 
 
 
Figure 5: Overlap ratio of landslide disaster and emergency transportation road (tertiary road) 




  For studying the tertiary road, we have analyzed 18 selected metropolitan cities and 
districts. Compared to the primary and secondary roads, it is observed that there is a larger 
disaster risk in different parts because of an avalanche in the Gifu prefecture. As 
avalanches cause widespread damage, it seems that the road also becomes impassable at 
wide range in the same way. There is a high risk of avalanches in the case where the slope 
gradient is 35–45 degrees and consists of sparse vegetation, compared to slopes with 
shrubs and forests. It can be assumed that tertiary roads in the mountainous areas are 
concentrated on slopes such as the ones described above. The drop in the supplementation 
and the lack of function of the emergency transportation road in the metropolitan cities 
and districts is the result of the high disaster risk of the tertiary road. 
 
4.3 Disaster risk due to flood 
  Similar to the disaster risk due to landslide, the duplicate ratio was analyzed by 
considering the flood assumption area and emergency transportation road in every 
prefecture.  It can be noted that the disaster risk was analyzed by defining ‘flooded’ with 
0.5 m for flood estimated areas, using data with boundaries of 0.5 m, 1 m, 2 m, and 5 m. 
This study was also designed to be consider transportation by car, with the exhaust port 
and non-driving motors completely flooded, to specify the rank. Figure 6 shows the graph 
that sums up the duplicate ratio for every designated rank.  
  Both primary and secondary roads show a higher overlap ratio in the Saitama prefecture, 
and the tertiary road showed a higher overlap ratio in the Niigata prefecture and the 
Hokuriku region of the Toyama prefecture. It should be noted that in the Saitama 
prefecture, the roads are concentrated around the river, which increases the risk of 
flooding due to overflowing. For the Hokuriku region, rainfall throughout the year is 




definitely a factor to consider. For the Toyama and Nigata prefectures, as the selection 
criteria for the tertiary road, the primary and secondary roads are set up here to contact 
the disaster prevention bases. This means that the overlap ratio of tertiary roads is high 
along emergency transportation roads, indicating that high disaster risks could be found 




Figure 6: Overlap ratio of flood estimated areas and emergency transportation roads 





5. The summary of this study and future plan 
 In this study, the disaster risk of the emergency transportation road network was 
estimated using three factors i.e., earthquakes, landslides, and floods. It was explained 
that an emergency transportation road was likely to be impassable to traffic at the time of 
the disaster. Regarding the earthquake, it was reealed that not only the Pacific side but 
also the tectonic dislocation carried a huge risk. It can be considered that the situation of 
broad-based transportation becomes difficult as the Itoigawa–Shizuoka tectonic line fault 
spread toward the north-south road network, which was split into east and west by the 
earthquake. Overlap was frequently observed in hilly and mountainous areas because of 
landslide disasters. When we consider a road in a mountainous region becoming 
impassable to traffic because of a landslide, then not only must the road itself be 
considered, but also the substitute characteristics of the road must be considered. A 
difference was seen between metropolitan cities and districts regarding flood risk. 
Because of a flood, a wide range area can be restricted regionally, and runs the risk of 
becoming impassable to the traffic above a certain level, in comparison to a landslide 
disaster. In this way, it was revealed that the disaster risk to the emergency transportation 
road was large even if we focused on individual hazards, such as earthquakes, landslides, 
and flooding.  
In the future, we will study the importance of emergency transport roads, focusing on 
alternative issues such as the extent to which the roads are affected by avalanches and 
typhoons, combined with various kinds of seasonal hazards. We want to push this study 
forward with a focus on the probability of a hazard occurring in real life. 
 







Reachability Analysis between Prefectural Office and Municipal 
Offices While Considering the Disaster Risk of Emergency 
Transportation Road 
 
In this study, it is intended to analyze the reachability between disaster prevention 
bases while considering the disaster risk of emergency transportation routes (ETR). Based 
on the lessons of Japan's Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, emergency transportation 
routes set to provide rescuing activities and transportation of goods immediately after the 
occurrence of earthquakes. The emergency transportation routes connect with the 
expressways, general highways and main roads and also links together with disaster 
prevention bases which are designated by the government. There have been accomplished 
a lot of researches in respect of general road blockage due to collapse of the roadside 
building so far. But there have been only a few studies done about securing the emergency 
transportation routes until now. We analyzed the risk of emergency transportation route 
obstruction by flooding, road blockage by buildings collapsed caused by earthquake and 
clarified the reachability between disaster prevention bases e.g. the prefectural offices and 
municipal offices. 
 
1. Background of the study 
 
  During the Kobe earthquake (Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake) that occurred in 5:46 
January 17, 1995. The earthquake damaged the elevated structure, such as a highway, 
railway, blocked of road surface by the collapsed of roadside building, the capacity of the 




affected areas was significantly reduced. In addition, the traffic demand was different than 
of normal or ordinary time because of the evacuation activities after the accident occurred. 
It was started emergency and rescue activities, relief activities, in relation to the recovery 
and reconstruction activities, etc. From the fact that the main trunk line which is used for 
Japan's east-west traffic were damaged, the next day of disaster occurred e.g. on the 18th 
January, emergency transportation route 2 of the east-west has been set to compensate for 
the damage situation. However, to regulate the route only by the emergency vehicle was 
actually difficult. The above-mentioned contents are shown as a collection of Hanshin 
Awaji Great Earthquake Disaster Lesson Information book in aggregation with the 
emergency transportation by the road traffic of Cabinet Office As it has also been 
mentioned in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake lesson information book, road 
blockage caused by a roadside building collapse during the earthquake, that it can be 
assumed that the roads were impassible. In addition, such as flood damage on the road by 
the river flooding or building collapsed on the road by an earthquake is assumed not to 
be able to pass by traffics. There have been accomplished a lot of researches in respect of 
general road blockages due to collapse of the roadside building so far (Kondo et al., 2010; 
Ichikawa et al., 2004; Tamura et al., 2005). On the other hand, study about the road section 
that may become impassable due to a disaster, considering between certain two points, or 
connectivity that is impassable interval is guaranteed even in the event, or the arrival delay, 
such as how much arrival delay occurs, it is important from the point of view of 
emergency transport in the event of a disaster. But it is the present condition that such a 
study has not done sufficiently. Therefore, in this study, we analyzed the emergency 
transportation at the time of the river flooding, at the time of the earthquake using the 
emergency transportation route and analyze the section that might be flooded by the 




flooding, the section that it might block up by the collapse of the building of the 
emergency transportation roads. Based on the result, we analyzed it by network analysis 
about the reachability between prefectural offices and municipal offices e.g. city, town 
and village offices. 
 
Table 1: Type and position of emergency transportation road 
 
 
2. Evaluation of this study and arrangement of the related past studies 
 
There are some researches on the evaluation of the road blockage caused by the 
earthquake (Kotani et al., Otani et al. and Akakura et al.). They show the risk evaluation 
formula of a road obstruction and extracts the environmental characteristics which is a 
factor to be advanced or suppress the obstruction by the damage aspects from those roads 
(Kotani et al.). Furthermore, by using the evaluation formula, we divide the Kanazawa 
city roads into 53 routes, which analyzes the different road blockage risk and road 
damages appearance by routes. Otani et al., write about the spread of cities and towns 
include (10 km square) factors that affect the disaster of road immediately after the 
earthquake. They also write about district facilities, such as road and highway facilities, 
Type Position
NO. 1     （1,102.4km）
High-standard highways-roads made transportation of wide
important routes such as the General Highway and access roads
No. 2     （ 651.9km）
The emergency transportation road which links cities, towns and
villages government office and link the important base with no.1
type
No. 3     （ 233.0km）
The emergency transportation road which link the cities, towns
and villages government office branch and link no.1 & no.2 type




such as road, bridge, footbridge and pedestrian bridge, roadside private facility (on the 
ground), water pipe, gas pipe, assesses the impact of road blockage by calculating the 
traffic capacity expected from it and set the private facilities (underground) considering 
each affected function fitting road blockage effects. Akakura et al. shows the model 
outbreak of the street blockage by earthquake vibration strength and street width and 
perform a damage prediction when Yokohama-shi center caught the earthquake of the 
scale equal to the Great Kanto Earthquake. In addition, there is the study example of the 
road blockage that utilized GIS. Minamoto et al. creates a road network that has applied 
for a prediction of the road obstruction. Minamoto et al. settle down a blockage 
probability calculation model and estimated blockage probability according to the 
collapse of the road side building, they divided the road’s width of less than 4m and the 
road’s width of more than 4m and less than 8m. 
There have been researches about the evacuation at the time of the disaster that was 
focused on road blockage, and also studies in the wide area disaster (Kondo et al., 
Ichikawa et al., and Tamura et al.). Hypothesis of Kondo et al. about street blockades, 
motions for damage to bridges, landslides collapse of the slope failure hazard area, specify 
the landslide site, districts control of sand erosion, tsunami inundation to road 
construction, and model isolated communities. Ichikawa et al. flow out the debris opens 
in all directions and width sets a collapse model to determine to the building height of the 
building individual and judges the road captivity basis on GIS. Tamura et al., have done 
the evacuation simulation at the time of tsunami inundation that takes into account the 
fact that street blockage occurs due to building collapse during an earthquake. Above in 
the previous studies, has focused on road obstruction by ground motion and multiple 
disaster (Kotani et al., Otani et al., Akakuraet al., and Minamoto et al.), the blockage 




situation of the road in the target areas in (Ichikawa, et al., Kondo et al.) isolation of days 
caused by the road blockage caused by the disaster in the village in the target area, Tamura 
et al., has a perspective of evacuation simulation from the flood damage caused by the 
tsunami in consideration of the road blockage caused by the ground motion. Therefore, 
this study stands in a viewpoint called the emergency transportation in consideration of 
the collapse of the building by the earthquake vibration. In addition, as an impassable 
factor by the flooding damage of the road, we intend for a tsunami, but assume it river 
flooding and marshes in this study. From the perspective of building collapse, this study 
follow as well as the Akakura et al., Ichikawa et al., and Minamoto et al., but while those 
studies are intended for a relatively limited area, whereas this study targeted a wide area 
e.g. between metropolis and districts agency and city and district town and village offices 
during emergency transport. Also, when the analysis of the road obstruction due to 
building collapse, Minamoto et al. and Ichikawa et al. used the GIS as well. However, 
Minamoto et al. calculate the probability of road blockage in consideration of the road’s 
width and they did not consider the height of the building. In this study, we determine the 
blockage of the road by the height of the building. 
 
3. Evaluation method of the disaster risk of ETR and construction method of the 
ETR network 
3.1 Data source of emergency transportation road network 
In this study, we use the emergency transportation roads of the national numerical land 
information data. These data is to create a route shape, division of the emergency 
transportation road, road classification, a route name using a local disaster prevention 
plan, the documentation about the emergency transportation road network plan which are 




organized by the metropolis and districts. 
3.2 Evaluation method of the disaster risk of ETR caused by the river flooding 
As one of the factors that emergency transportation road becomes unusable, it can be 
considered flood damage. In this study in order to assess the flood damage of ETR, it has 
been received the use of anticipated flooding zone data of the country numerical 
information inundation assumption area and assumed inundation depth at the national 
scale. Bedside the flooding assumption, in this data it is organized the immersion depth 
of the river and data plan rainfall of the object such as underlying the specified inundation 
assumption area. Inundation is divided into 5 or 7 level shown in table 2.The situation 
where the road becomes unusable by flooding, in this study it is defined as the depth of 
immersion; car becomes impossible of traveling. Generally, depth immersion of the 
automobile is unable traveling are the depth of the floor of the vehicle are flooded.  
 
Table 2: Inundation depth level and road conditions 
 
 
Therefore, of the Table 2, to evaluate as a section that emergency transportation road 
5 Levels 7 Levels
below 0～0.5m below 0～0.5m Not flooded
below 0.5m～1.0 below 0.5m～1.0m
below 1.0～2.0m below 1.0m～2.0m
below 2.0m～5.0m below 2.0m～3.0m











inundation depth to exist in inundation assumed within the area that fall into more than 
0.5m may become unusable by flooding when the rivers flood. In addition, the flood zone 
of emergency transportation road, as shown in Figure 1, the emergency transport roads 
and inundation assumption area data of the country numerical information when it is piled 
up on a GIS, both of interval were completely matched. 
 
 
Figure 1: Evaluation of conceptual diagram of the inundation zone of the ETR 
3.3 Evaluation method of the risk related to building collapse and road blockage 
caused by the earthquake 
Another factor that emergency transportation road becomes unusable, it is thought that 
buildings along the roadside comes to collapse on emergency transportation road at the 
time of the earthquake. To evaluate the risk of a road obstruction by buildings collapsed, 
it is required the data of the position and height of building, construction time and about 
冠水と 評価
0 . 5m 以上の浸水想定区域内の緊急輸送道路
非冠水と 評価
浸水想定区域外の緊急輸送道路




the structure of the building, etc. Such kind of data is what is freely available with a 
limited amount of information, if further directed to a wide range of area as in this study, 
the data’s availability is almost nil. Therefore, we tried to make the data available to 
understand the height and position of the building in the present study. We were using the 
data creation of a detailed map 201 214 provided by the ESRI Japan. This data is a 
background map database that has been developed by processing and map data of the 
ZENRIN Co., Ltd., and base map information and national land numerical information 
of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. That is, a variety of information on 
the map data of the individual. The data about the desired building are included in this 
study, kind and height of the building are compiled into a database. Incidentally, the height 
of the building has been considered by one floor per 3m, the type of buildings are uniquely 
classified. Such data can take advantage of the position and height as possible grasp of 
the building data. It shows the data of the above example in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Example of all detailed map data and building data 
 









However, in order to consider the building collapse due to earthquake, it is further 
necessary the structural form information of the building such as building ages. The 
structure type of the building, were classified as wooden and non-wooden as shown in 
Table 3 according to the classification of the data. The building classification that are 
assigned to the residence was a wooden, but also includes high-rise dwellings, such as 
apartment in this classification. For this reason, the fourth floor or more of the building 
(building height is more than 9m) it was classified as non-wooden. From the fact that 
information is insufficient with respect to building age, it is assumed that all in the present 
study is a building that was built with the latest building standards. By this assumption, 
its results for the building collapse indicated by this study and it will be a minimum 
damage estimation of the case. Building data created in the above steps, in government 
buildings not to appeal all the data. Therefore, in areas along emergency transport roads, 
and to extract only the data that affect the obstruction of emergency transportation roads 
to collapsed buildings.  

















Non-wooden Target object(Hospital) Non-wooden
Target object(School) Non-wooden Target object(Transport) Non-wooden
Target object(ammusement park 
etc)
Non-wooden
General house (and other) 
o below 3rd floor
Wooden
Target object (Target object) Non-wooden
General house (and other) 
above 4th floor
Non-wooden




  If a building affect the emergency transportation road when collapsed it is evaluated 
based on the positional relationship between the height of that building and the place 
where it is collapsed on the road. It shows the extraction flow diagram of the building that 
affect the emergency transportation road in Figure 3. Extraction of the building, to 
determine the center of gravity of the building, from the center of gravity obtained, after 
drawing a circle to the height of the building as a radius, the building affects the 
emergency transportation roads when the road including within the circle. It performed 
in the procedure that is extracted as a given building. For buildings along emergency 
transport roads we created in this step, J-SHIS earthquake hazard stations are exposed by 
earthquake motion estimation map, to determine if there is a possibility of suffering from 
the shaking intensity of the extent to which expected seismic area grid. 
 
Figure 3: Extraction flow diagram of the building that affect the emergency transportation road 
By performing extraction and assumed measurement seismic intensity determination 
data creation and data necessary as described above, data for evaluating the risk of 
blockage the emergency transportation roads by building collapse caused by an 
earthquake are associated. In order to evaluate the risk, for these data, it applies the 
damage function of the building due to an earthquake, to determine the total collapse 
probability of each building. Then the random simulation, it is determined whether or not 
n Extract the circles those are includes of 
inside of the Emergency Transportation 
Road
n Finding the center of gravity of the 
building
n Drawing a circle with the height of 
building with a radius from the center 
of gravity obtained
n Buildings those are falling  into the 
extracted circles are the building that 
affect the Emergency Transportation 
Road




the building is destroyed, if it is destroyed then assessed that building occurs a road 
blockage in the emergency transportation roads adjacent. 
3.4 How to build an emergency transportation road network in consideration of 
disaster risk. 
Figure 4 shows a conceptual diagram of how to build an emergency transportation road 
network when considering disaster risk. Emergency transportation road network when 
considering disaster risk e.g. deleted network as an impassable section of the affected part 
of peacetime emergency transportation road network. Therefore, when considering the 
flooding of the road by the river flood deletes the submerged section, when considering a 
road obstruction caused by building collapse due to the earthquake, the results of random 
simulations, road building, which is determined to be destroyed due to an earthquake is 
adjacent it is sufficient to remove a section. The link connecting the emergency 
transportation road network and shelter is required in order to perform network analysis. 
This link we created as a straight line of the shortest connecting from the shelter to the 




Figure 4: How to build a conceptual diagram of ETR network in consideration of disaster risk 
平時のネッ ト ワーク か








4. Analysis of reachability between Prefectural and municipal offices 
 
4.1 The target area, factors of disasters and impassable of emergency transportation 
road, and municipal offices. 
The study area is intended for Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Nagano and Gifu 
Prefecture. Figure 5 shows the emergency transport road network of peacetime and it is 
studied by each prefecture. It is intended for disaster in both river flooding caused by 
earthquake and rainfall and complex cases. The impassable factors of emergency 
transportation road, it is assumed and the obstruction of emergency transportation road 
caused by the collapsed of the road side building by an earthquake, a flood of emergency 
transportation road by the river flooding. It indicates the targeted number of local 
government office in Table 4. Municipal office of concern, was set on the basis of the 
municipal office data of digital national land information. 
 
Table 4: The number of targeted municipal offices of 6 prefectures to be analyzed 
Niigata Toyama Ishikawa Fukui Nagano Gifu 
36 15 19 17 77 42 
 
   The present data about the special districts and municipal offices of nationwide is the 
time of August 31, 2014. It is included about the main offices and their branch offices, 
their locations, respectively personal and their name and designations. However it 
extracts only the Prefectures from the agency data for national and prefectural of the 
country numerical information about six Prefecture and used in the analysis. 





Figure 5: Emergency transportation road network diagram of peace time in the target area 
 
 4.2 Analysis of reachability between the prefectural government and the local 
government office in consideration of the flood of emergency transportation road by 
the river flooding.  
The emergency transportation road section that may flood is caused by river flooding 
in Figure 6, we show the emergency transportation road network in consideration of 
immersion depth was evaluated as it is described in section 3.2 in which there is a risk of 
flooding the road section to be than 0.5m. It is revealed the effect to the reachability in 
this study, from the Prefectural Government office using emergency transportation roads 
to each local government office trying to reach emergency transport roads in the case of 
river flooding. Therefore, the data is shown all emergency transportation roads contained 
0.5 m or more in the flooding expected area. The flooding is expected in the area of 
sections impassable due to flooding. In Table 5, it shows the numbers of unreachability 




and delays to the municipality offices while considering the flood risk of emergency 
transportation road. 
 
Figure 6: Emergency transportation road network diagram in consideration of the flood risk 
 
Table 5: Numbers of unreachability and delays to the municipality offices while considering the 
flood risk of ETR 
 
Prefectures Niigata Toyama Ishikawa Fukui Nagano Gifu
Target no. of 
municipal 
offices
36 15 19 17 77 42
Number of 
unreachability
16 14 16 16 35 41
Percentage of 
unreachability
44.4% 93.3% 84.2% 94.1% 45.5% 97.6%
Number of 
delays
18 0 2 1 35 0
Percentage of 
delays
50.0% 0.0% 10.5% 5.9% 45.5% 0.0%




  In addition, it shows the service area from the normal time of the prefectural 
government at the time of flooding consider using emergency transportation road network 
of six prefectures that targets in figure 7. From table 5, it suggests that the flood risk that 
could become unreachable on emergency transportation road connecting the prefectural 
government and municipal office in any of six prefectures is abundant. In particular, 
Toyama Prefecture, Fukui Prefecture, Gifu Prefecture, local government office that can 
be reached without the risk in Ishikawa Prefecture is limited. Toyama, Fukui, Gifu 
Prefecture is through the river near the prefectural government, for emergency 
transportation road with flood risk is dense, it becomes a state of emergency 
transportation road network has been cut off in the vicinity of the prefectural government. 
The service area shown in figure 7 has become a result that does not extend only a small 
range in the vicinity of the prefectural government. Also, unlike these three prefectures, 
but it will not be cut off emergency transportation road network in the vicinity of the 
prefectural government, because it is a long and narrow terrain from north to south, is 
limited emergency transportation road that can be moved to the north-south direction. In 
addition to this, these emergency transportation roads and through rivers in the form of 
crossing, and has a form of access to the north and south are shredded from the Prefectural 
central portion of a flood risk existing in the surrounding. For this reason, it became a 
result of the service area is extended only to the province center. For emergency 
transportation road network in the northeast portion is cut off because of the flood risk 
from rivers flowing through the province northeast in Nagano Prefecture, that there is a 
part to reach impassable interval and, reaching through the northeast from the prefectural 
government. It is because within the municipal offices can be reached in the shortest, also 
the delay has occurred in many cases. In the Niigata Prefecture, there is presence of flood 




risk in a wide range of emergency transportation road by the Shinano and Agano, but 
because the county center does not exist rivers, by emergency transportation road passing 
through the area of north-south it can be read from figure 7 that the connection of 
emergency transportation road network is barely maintained. 
4.3 Analysis of reachability between Prefectural government offices and municipal 
offices in consideration of buildings collapsed that make the road blockage by the 
earthquake. 
 The assumption of ground motion for consideration of the building collapse, it is 
conceivable to use a stochastic ground motion expected to map and scenario earthquake. 
In this study, we aimed to analyze the affected possibility of emergency transportation 
road upon comprehensively considering disasters that might occur in the future. Because 
the scenario earthquake is only one of the earthquake which may occur future utilize 
probabilistic seismic hazard map we are comprehensively predict earthquakes which can 
occur in the future. As a result it can be analyzed the likely disaster emergency 
transportation roads from a long-term perspective, and will prove useful to the disaster 
measures and priority selection. 
As we consider the building collapsed due to an earthquake, in the present study 
measuring seismic intensity distribution in the case of a 2 percent of 50-year exceedance 
probability of the J-SHIS earthquake hazard station probabilistic seismic hazard map 
(figure 8) is used. In addition, demolished curve rate (Figure 9, figure 10) that have been 
shown in Tokyo disaster prevention envisioned as damage function of the building was 
adopted. It gave a total collapse rate in building data created by the procedure described 
in 3.3 





Figure 7: Service area from the core capital of six prefectures using ETR in peace time while 
considering flood disaster. 
  The height of the building has been calculated according to rank as the one floor or per 
floor is 3m. In other words, it has become a value of height 15m as long as it is a building 
of five-story. In addition, the type of building has its own classification. Such data can be 
used as available building data to understand the position and height. As shown in Fig. 2, 
we extract only the data which is related to the buildings form the information of detailed 





























building collapsed due to the earthquake, it is further needed the information of building 
structures. The structure type of the building, were classified as wooden and non-wooden 
as shown in Table 3 according to the classification of the data. 
All of this research is assumed to be a building that was built in the current building 
standards. With this assumption, the risk of road blockage due to collapse of the building 
indicated by the present study is the minimum damage estimation case. 
 
 
Figure 8: Distribution on ETR of measuring seismic intensity which is a 2% of 50 years exceedance 
probability 
 
Numbers of buildings along emergency transport roads, 0 to 100 in increments of 0.1 
random-number generation, exceeding the rate of collapse occurs and completely 
destroyed the building, choking emergency transport roads adjacent to and building 
collapse simulation. Emergency transport road network by considering the road blockages 




shown in Figure 11. However, in this study it shows one time random simulation. It shows 
a comparison result of the emergency transportation road network at the peace time in 
Table 6. In addition, it shows the service area from each of the prefectural government in 
the case of considering the building collapsed due to an earthquake in six prefectures in 
Figure 12. In this simulation, exception of Niigata and Nagano Prefecture, all the other 
four prefectures, there was no unreachable occurrence in the municipal offices. On the 
other hand, in the five prefectures except for the Niigata Prefecture has resulted in 
municipal office a delay occurs before reaching occupies the majority. From Figure 12, 
the service area in any of the six prefectures subject extends widely in the prefecture 
whole area. However, as is evident from Figure 8 in Niigata and Nagano Prefecture, the 
emergency transportation roads with high measurement seismic intensity is expected to 
have abundant.  
 
 
Figure 9: Fragility curves of wooden building 
 
 





Figure 10: Fragility curves of non-wooden building 
 Like these two prefectures (Niigata and Nagano), there are some region of Ishikawa, 
Toyama and Gifu Prefecture where the emergency transportation road is expected to high 
seismic intensity. As part of the road is blocked, it is possible to substitute other 
emergency transportation roads in these three prefectures, and they will not be 
unreachable. However, a delay occurs when a such a road block section overlap each 
other on the shortest route to the municipal office. From this fact, it is considered to be a 
road block section caused by the building collapse was overlapped in these shortest path 
in five prefectures exception of Niigata Prefecture. 
So, there is a clear tendency to highway blockages by roadside buildings in this two 
prefectures. In addition, emergency transportation roads such high seismic intensity is 
expected to be present enough in the network is sparse part. It cannot be substitute any 
other emergency transport roads resulted from collapsed buildings in these areas. There 
are some partially unreachable regions can be read from Figure12. 
 




Table 6: Number of unreachability and delays to the municipal offices when considering the 






Figure 11: ETR network in consideration of the building collapsed and road blockage caused by the 
earthquake 
Prefectures Niigata Toyama Ishikawa Fukui Nagano Gifu
Target no. of 
municipal 
offices
36 15 19 17 77 42
Number of 
unreachability
3 1 0 0 9 0
Percentage of 
unreachability
8.3% 6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 11.7% 0.0%
Number of 
delays
9 14 19 17 58 42
Percentage of 
delays
25.0% 93.3% 100.0% 100.0% 75.3% 100.0%






Figure 12: Service area from the core capital of 6 prefectures with ETR at the time of building 
collapsed due to an earthquake 
 
4.4 Analysis of reachability between the Prefectural and the local office in 
consideration of the complex case of earthquake and river flooding 
 
In the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred on March 11, 2011, it was not only 
the earthquake, a number of disasters such as tsunami and fire disaster occurred in 

















occurred frequently those are not only individual disasters, they are in form of a number 
of disasters or complex disaster. Therefore it is increasing the importance of analyzing 
the damage in the case of complex disaster. Based on this background, in the present study, 
consider the flood of emergency transportation road by the river flooding, the road 
blockage and cases that occur at the same time due to the building collapse caused by the 
earthquake. Emergency transportation road network to be analyzed in this case is a 
network that was all the intervals has become impassable in each disaster case, as shown 
in Figure 13. It should be noted that the present case is to be referred to as a complex case. 
It shows a comparison result of the emergency transportation road network at the peace 
time in Table 7. It also shows the service area from the prefectural government of a 
complex case in the six prefectures subject in Figure 14. Than the influence of road 
obstruction due to building collapse by earthquake in all prefectures in Figure12. From 
table-5, table-6 and Figure 7 which is a big impact of flooding by the river flooding. The 
overall result is reaching the municipal office becomes difficult when the road blockage 
by buildings collapsed overlaps a section that is generally not influenced by the flood.  
 
Figure 13: Emergency transportation road network diagram in consideration of the complex case 




Table 7: Number of unreachability and delays to the municipal office of the complex case 
 
From Table 7, it can be seen, in the Niigata and Nagano Prefecture, impact of flooding 
was less than another prefecture, but the local government office to be a maximum 
unreachable in Nagano Prefecture has occurred. In particular, in the Nagano Prefecture, 
but only affected by flooding the road network had been kept connectivity in the north 
and south, was revealed from the service area of Figure 14. That caused road blockages 
caused by collapsed buildings in the sector was not affected by the flooding, extends only 
to the northern side of Prefectural Government is impeding North-South service area. On 
the other hand, Niigata Prefecture, is a network that connects the north and south of the 
prefecture at the impact of the flooding had become sparse, it did not overlap with the 
road obstruction by building collapse in the interval. In Nigata, it is not observed 
significant steep of unreachability of the service area, such as the Nagano Prefecture. Also, 
it can hardly reach to the provinces north and south of the municipal office in the impact 
of the flooding in the Ishikawa Prefecture. But no change was observed in the area which 
were affected by the earthquake in the middle part of Ishikawa. The network has received 
Prefectures Niigata Toyama Ishikawa Fukui Nagano Gifu
Target no. of 
municipal 
offices
36 15 19 17 77 42
Number of 
unreachability
18 14 16 16 67 41
Percentage of 
unreachability
50.0% 93.3% 84.2% 94.1% 87.0% 97.6%
Number of 
delays
16 0 2 1 9 0
Percentage of 
delays
44.4% 0.0% 10.5% 5.9% 11.7% 0.0%




a devastating impact by flooding in Toyama, Fukui and Gifu Prefecture, from that section 
in which connectivity is maintained was very limited from the prefectural government, 
though the impact of the earthquake is not seen. 
 
 





















5. Conclusion  
  In the present study, it is analyzed the disaster vulnerability of emergency 
transportation road in the case of flooding due to river flooding, road blockage due to 
building collapse caused by the earthquake, and both the complex case of flooding and 
earthquake. Based on the analysis of disaster risk, then we analyzed reachability of 
emergency transportation road between the prefectural and municipal offices. The target 
area of the study is the six prefectures namely Ishikawa, Toyama, Fukui, Niigata, Nagano 
and Gifu. The network analysis of impassable section of the emergency transport road 
that could be flooded by the river flooding, except the Niigata and Nagano Prefecture, it 
is revealed that more than 80% was unreachable between the prefecture and municipal 
offices. In particular, there is a threatening of flooding by the rivers those are flowing near 
the prefectural offices of Toyama, Fukui and Gifu prefecture. It is a possibility that many 
emergency transportation roads around the prefectural office could be flooded, that is why 
it became a result that it is impossible to reach the municipal offices from the prefecture. 
  In the analysis of the building collapsed by earthquake that make road blockage, we 
considered the road-side building of emergency transportation roads. For the building 
collapse, we take the measurement seismic intensity which is a 2% exceedance 
probability of 50 years. Among the wide range of six prefectures, the maximum 
unreachability cases occurred in the municipal offices of Niigata and Nagano Prefecture. 
Like these two prefectures, there are some region of Ishikawa, Toyama and Gifu 
Prefecture where the emergency transportation road is expected to high seismic intensity. 
As part of the road is blocked, it is possible to substitute other emergency transportation 
roads in these three prefectures, and they will not be unreachable. However, a delay occurs 
when a such a road block section overlap each other on the shortest route to the municipal 





In the analysis of complex cases of flood and earthquake, Niigata, Nagano, effect of 
submergence, has occurred is sparse part to passable of emergency transportation road 
network. Of these, in Nagano Prefecture road block section due to building collapse 
caused by the earthquake has overlapped with this sparse part. If evaluated the impact of 
roads closed due to flooding and collapsed buildings, each alone, it was kept the network 
connectivity. Reduced service area from the Prefectural Government and also increased 
municipal network is disrupted in the complex case, it becomes unreachable. 
  In this study, it was analyzed the building data of GIS. Targeting a broad-area, there is 
an advantage to be able to consider the height of the building. But we did not consider the 
road width. So there is a chance for over-estimating the road obstruction. As for the 
collapse judgment of the building, it is carried out the judgment process only one time by 

















Large-scale River Disaster in Kanazawa City, Japan: A case of 





In recent years, frequent floods are occurring caused by the local torrential heavy rain 
and typhoon nationwide. Residents are able to receive information such as forecasting 
and warning before the flood disaster occurs and can take pre-preparation and evacuation 
unlike earthquakes. However, because of the lack of awareness and previous experiences 
of the disaster, despite the providing evacuation information, residents don’t get well-
prepared themselves and hence, the evacuation process is delayed. In that case the damage 
is increased. 
In July 28, 2008 early morning, Kanazawa City was hit by record heavy rain. This 
heavy rain was recorded as 100mm or more within one hour in the central Kanazawa city. 
As a result, Asanogawa is flooded for the first time in '55 years, and large-scale flooding 
has occurred in Kanazawa city. During that enormous damage, about 20000 households 
were provided evacuation advisory information among 50,000 residents in the 
Asanogawa basin. 
Figure 1 shows the ranking of prefectures about the cumulative flood damage costs in 
past 10 years. Cumulative maximum amount of damage of the past 10 years is 4,696 
billion yen in Hyogo Prefecture. The average amount of damage across the country is 
57.6 billion yen. The cumulative amount of damage in Ishikawa prefecture is about 10 








Figure 1: Cumulative costs of flood damage of last 10 years in different prefectures in Japan  
(MILT River Bureau, Japan; 2012) 
 
Figure 2 shows the transition of the past 10 years by prefecture flood damage costs. In 
the figure it is shown that the amount of cumulative damage of Hyogo Prefecture is the 
highest compared with those of three prefectures of Hokuriku in the past 10 years. In the 
past 10 years, in Ishikawa prefecture, the damage was 1 billion yen annually; however, 
the damage of about 10 billion yen has occurred during the 2008 flood. In addition, 
Ishikawa prefecture tended a large amount of damage than those of Toyama and Fukui 
prefectures. One can assume about the frequent flood in Kanazawa City from the above 
information. It is not in areas where extensive damage has occurred in the past, are 




























































































































Figure 2: Evolution of the cost of flood damage over the past decade in different prefectures 
(MILT River Bureau, Japan; 2012) 
 
 
A lot of researches have been done focusing on the conventional evacuation behavior 
and consciousness of residents at the time of flood disaster. The study (Katada et al., 2001; 
Oikawa et al., 2002) revealed that the decision-making processes and disaster experience 
impacts the evacuation. Moreover, the study (Katada et al., 2001)takes account into the 
decision making in the evacuation activity of the inhabitant, and analyzed the effect of 
flood experience of the inhabitant on the disaster consciousness and the decision making 
process of the evacuation activity. They also concluded that the atrophy of disaster 
consciousness delays the evacuation activity, and though the damage experience in the 
flood disaster enhance the disaster consciousness, the damage experience of the 
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In addition, research (Oikawa and Katada, 1999) conducted on analysis of flood damage 
and residence behavior about disaster information in large urban areas (Tokai heavy rain, 
2000). 
 
There are studies of Asanogawa flood, carried out by MILT, River Bureau 2012 and 
New River Management Committee (Ishikawa Prefecture), Japan. MILT, River Bureau 
2012, discussed the role of the construction development in recovery and reconstruction 
from flood damage at the local city. New River Management Committee (Ishikawa 
Prefecture), reported about the flood that hits the local city after 55 years. On the other 
hand, Kurooka, and Tamai discussed Asanogawa flood from the point of view of 
government, such as counseling assistance and flood control system to the victims. 
Moreover, as a result of the review of the Asanogawa flood disaster, it is found that the 
local city government has lack of infrastructure development, experience and reality 
analysis as the flood occurred after 55 years. 
In this study, both hardware and software technology are paying attention to the 
vulnerable areas to local city and flood. At the time of Kanazawa Asanogawa heavy rain 
disaster that occurred in July 2008, specifically "evacuation preparation information", 
"evacuation advisory", and "evacuation order" a questionnaire survey was conducted 
targeting the districts that has been flooded, and it is intended to clarify the actual 
condition of the evacuation, and awareness of disaster prevention. 
 
2. Importance of Evacuation  
 
Evacuation is considered a way to prepare people when at risk from an impending 




hazard (Taylor and Freeman, 2010). It is an important part of disaster management and is 
an effective way of minimizing loss of lives and property damage (Na et al., 2012). It is 
considered a process(as presented in Figure 1)that constitutes hazard detection, issuance 
of warning, preparation to evacuate, movement to identified shelters through 
network(Stepanov and Smith, 2009), and reentry to the community after 
disaster(EMA,2005). In addition, the process comprises route assignment and 
management approaches, providing emergency-related services as well as attending to 
people with special needs such as the elderly and disabled, and coordination and 
management of evacuation fleets (Hsu and Peeta, 2012).  
Effective communication is crucial to the management of evacuations from flooding, 
hurricanes, and other disaster events that are forewarned by improving systems of 
prediction and monitoring(Sorensen 2000).However, evacuation orders do not lead to 
complete compliance; some residents refuse to leave and choose to stay (Miletiet al. 1975), 
others leave when they are not at significant risk. Despite the importance of efficient and 
effective evacuations (Lindell andPrater 2007; SimonovicandAhmad2005), a relatively 
scarce amount of research has examined disaster message communication. 
 
As we see time and time again, for as much research as has been conducted on the 
issue of evacuation, our understanding of evacuations extremely limited. Those expected 
to evacuate often do not, and those who should not evacuate at least in the estimation of 
emergency managers often do. The following focuses on the body of literature that 
specifically emphasized understanding evacuation compliance with a discussion of the 
small, but growing literature focused on the evacuation decision-making process itself. 
Research on evacuation has focused on the characteristics of those who evacuate and 




those who do not (Baker 1979; Cross1979; Baker 1991; Fischer et al. 1995; Dow and 
Cutter 1998; Drabek 1999) or on difficulties associated with evacuation (Baker1980; 
Mileti and Sorenson 1987). Other research, such as (Perry and colleagues 1981, Gladwin 
and Peacock 1997, and Whitehead et al. 2000) attempted to model evacuation compliance, 
while (Lindell et al. 2005) focused on household decision making as it relates to hurricane 
evacuation. It appears that overtime, more complex models of evacuation compliance 
have developed, often, but not always, with risk perception as a central focus and with 
more reliable indicators of evacuation behavior (Baker 1991).   
From field surveys of real cases such as the Niigata flood disaster in 2004 (Gunma 
University, 2004; Intensive Heavy Rainfall Disaster Policy Committee, 2004), many 
people know where the refuge is but they do not know how the situation will progress 
with certainty and which route is safe under the emergency situation. Static hazard maps 
may not always help them when an actual disaster happens. Instructions that do not 
consider the evolution of damage over time and threats of probable additional destruction 
and deterioration can result in suboptimal decisions that can lead to unnecessarily impose 
risk and unnecessarily lost lives (Miller-Hooks and Krauthammer, 2002). In addition, 
people’s evacuation behaviors such as evacuation time and walking speed also have an 
effect on the optimal strategy. 
 
3. Flood Disaster of Asanogawa River, Kanazawa, Ishikawa  
 
3.1 Asanogawa flood Overview 
 
Asanogawa River is the secondary river of the Onogawa river basin system, the 
overall length is about 32.5km (Figure 3). In addition, it originates in the vicinity of Jun-




Oyama (883m) which is located on the border of the Toyama prefecture. Asanogawa is 
flowing in the central part of Kanazawa city and it joins to the Onogawa in the port area 
of Kanazawa. This river flows very gently and offers a moderate 
 
Waterfront to the citizen living around it. Before the July 2008 flood, in the past 55 years 
no flood occurred in Asanogawa River which has no dam. The last flood disaster occurred 
in 23rd July 1953 e.g. the Kaga flood of the Asanogawa River. 
Previously in 1952 and 1953 Asanoga River was flooded by localized torrential heavy 
rain. As a result, a lot of bridges washed away and it took a new disaster prevention 
measures. Then it was decided that a dam construction was required to complete the 
waterway to the Saigawariver.As there was no suitable terrain for dam construction in 
Asanogawa basin, that’s why in 1974, a water channel was constructed to direct the flood 
water to Saigawa River. However, July 28, 2008 occurred flooding in 55 years in 
torrential rain, Yuwaku hot spring and its downstream, the surrounding Higashi Chaya 
District was damaged. Temporary evacuation order has been issued to about 20,000 
households among 50,000 residents in the Asanogawa river basin. At this time, the water 
channel to Saigawawas running; however, the excess water cross the capacity of the river, 
therefore damage expanded to the basin area. 
 






Figure 3: Basin area of Asanogawa, Saigawa and Onogawa rivers (RMCC, Ishikawa Chapter 2008) 
 
 
3.2 Rainfall situation of Asanogawa basin  
 
Figure 4 shows the rainfall situation (up to 3 hours) in the Asanogawa river basin 
area in 28 July, 2008. Maximum precipitation reached to 60mm/hr. in Iouzen [11] and 
138mm/hr. at Shibahara-Bashi (Ishikawa prefecture). According to the observation of 
Ishikawa prefecture, at Shibahara-Bashi (which joint place of Asanogawa and Iouzen 
Yamagawa), there was a rainfall up to 300mm in 3hours (5a. m to 8a. m). (Ishikawa 
prefecture Disaster Weather Information 2008). 
 
Onogawa basin area: 369km2 
Asanogawa basin area: 80km2 
Saigawa basin area: 256km2 
Asanogawa basin 










3.3 Rainfall measurement result of Asanogawa basin 
Figure 5 shows the measurement data of rain gauge (Shibahara bridge-position) 
that is installed by Ishikawa Prefecture in Asanogawa river basin. It shows that the rainfall 
was 114mm at 7 a.m., and 111mm at 8 a.m. Furthermore, it is understood and it is from 
the measurement results of the 10 minute interval rainfall and there was rainfall of 138mm 
per hour at the time of 6:30 to 7:30. On the other hand, with the rainfall that has been 
measured since at 9a.m., which was a slight, but almost no change in the total rainfall. 
There was a rainfall of cumulative 251mm in about 3 hours from 6:00 a.m. to 8 a.m. from 
the above result. So it can be said that there was a ferocious rainfall of time average 83mm 
per hour 







Figure 5: Observations of rain gauge, Asanogawa River basin (RMCC, Ishikawa Chapter 2008) 
 
Figure 6 shows that there is a period precipitation distribution (July 27th to July 29th) of 
Ishikawa and Toyama prefecture. 
 
Rainfall /3 hours 
28th July (5a.m to 8 a.m.) 
251.0mm 
138mm/60min 
(6:30 a.m. to 7:30 a.m.) 





Figure 6: Recording the fierce rain which exceeds time rainfall 100mm (Flood report MILT 2008) 
 
 
3.4 Issuance status of evacuation information 
 
Table 1 describes the issuance status about evacuation information that has been 
issued at the time of heavy rainfall on July 28, 2008.Evacuation order has been issued for 
the whole area of the Asanogawa river basin is 8:50 a.m.to 11:45 a.m. among the 20,739 
households where the population is 50,453. There was also evacuation advisory for the 
Kanazawa city (Onugawa basin) and Uchinada city from 9:50 a.m. to 12:55 respectively 
(Fire and Disaster Management Agency (FDMA), Japan; 9thSeptember, 2008 [Report on 
disaster information and damage situation by heavy rain, etc. of 28 July, 2008 (part-7)]. 
The fact is that the peak of the torrential rains observed from 7 a.m.to 8 a.m. And it 





(Kanazawa city, Ishikawa) 








The change inwater level of the Asanogawa River is shown in Figure 7. From this 
figure, it can be noted that the water level of the Asanogawa river was started rising from 
7 a.m.At 7:30, it started overflowing. At 7:40, it exceededthe evacuation judgment water 
level.In addition, at 7:50 it had reached to inundation dangerous water level. 
After that, 8:20 it reaches to flood design rank. At 8:40, it traces the lapse which 
exceeds the observation upper limit. However, at this point the evacuation instructions 
have been issued at 8:50 and the surround area of the Asanogawa River had been flooded. 
Within ten minutes (7:30 a.m. to 7:40 a.m.), maximum rising of water level was 0.43m. 
Within thirty minutes (7:20 a.m. to 7:50 a.m.), maximum rising of water level was 1.20m. 
 
 



























Figure 7: Measurement of the water level of Asanogawa River (RMCC, Ishikawa Chapter 2008) 
 
3.5 Damage circumstance of the Asanogawa river flood, Kanazawa 
 
Though there was no death report for Asanogawa river flood disaster 2008, but a lot 
of properties had been destroyed. The damage circumstance by the Asanogawa river flood, 
Kanazawa is shown in Table 2. At the time of the flood damage, flooding on the floor was 
507, flooding under the floor was 1,486. In addition, there was complete destruction of 2 
houses, half collapsed 9 houses and the partly damage of 6 houses [Fire and Disaster 
Management Agency (FDMA), Japan; 9thSeptember, 2008 (Report on disaster 





10min; maximum rising of water level 0.43m [7:30 to 7:40] 
30min; maximum rising of water level 1.20m [7:20 to 7:50] 
 








3.6 Anticipated inundation area of the Asanogawa river basin 
 
   Figure 8 shows the anticipated inundation zone of the Asanogawa river basin. The 
flooding has been assumed is a city area of the Asanogawa downstream region. 
Inundation depth is 2.0m at the maximum. The flooding of 0.5m was supposed even in 
the area which is far from the Asanogawa River. When Asanogawa was flooded in 2008, 
the flood damage also has occurred around the anticipated inundation area. 
 
 
Figure 8: Anticipated inundation area 
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This chapter describes the methodology used in this study. The first section 
discusses the selection of the case study, provides a description of the study area, and 
describes the methods used for data collection. This section is followed by a description 
of the statistical techniques for data analysis. The final section provides information about 
the population sample statistics as well as descriptive statistics of the Asanogawa Flood 
evacuation survey response data. 
 
4.1 Asanogawa River in Kanazawa city 
In Ishikawa prefecture, there are two main rivers, namely Saigawa (34.5 km long) and 
Asanogawa (28.9km long). Asanogawa is flowing in the center part of Kanazawa city. 
This river flows very gently and offers a moderate waterfront to the citizen living around 
it. Before the July 2008 flood, in the past 55 years no flood occurred in Asanogawa River 
which has no dam. The last flood disaster occurred in 23rd July 1953 e.g. the Kaga flood 
of the Asanogawa River. Figure 9 shows the Asanogawa river in Kanazawa city. 
 
 






Figure 9: Asanogawa River in Kanazawa, Ishikawa (Annuals of DPRI, Kyoto University, 2009) 
 
4.2 Flooding circumstances of Kanazawa City 
On 28 July 2008, there was a localized torrential rainfall over the area around the 
Asanogawa River in Kanazawa city, Ishikawa Prefecture, Japan. That torrential rainfall 
was remarkable for the total rainfall and the amount of rainfall within a short period of 
time that brought backlogs, flooding homes, causing landslides and leaving serious 
damage. 
The muddy flood water flowed into fields and rice paddies, fruit trees were washed down, 
and the rice was filled up with a large amount of mud. In several areas where the river 
narrowed, or at bends, flood water overflowed the dike. Because of delays in closing the 




floodgate, the river overflowed at opening in the dike called ‘kirikaki’.This heavy rainfall 
caused over topping from the Asanogawa River running through the downtown of 
Kanazawa City. The inundation water depth was over 1 m and large amount of sediment 
deposited in the city area. This disaster is referred to as the Asanogawa flood of 2008.  
 
Figure 10 (A): Flooding circumstances of Kanazawa city (MILT, Japan 2008) 
 
 
Figure 10 (B): Flooding circumstances of Kanazawa city (MILT, Japan 2008) 
 
 





Figure 11: Residents clean up the mud flooding into their houses on July 28, 2008 in Kanazawa, 




4.3 Survey instrument 
 
4.3.1. Population and sample 
Table 3 describes the distribution of the sample by gender and profession. It is noticed 
from the table that the percentage of male and female respondents are 42.86% and 57.13% 
respectively. Among all types of professions, the maximum response is received from 
private employees in case of male respondents (33.79%) and housewives in case of 




female respondents (32.89%).   
Table 3: Gender and profession wise distribution of the sample 
 
 
Table 4 shows the distribution of the sample by gender and generation. It reveals that 
among male respondents, the highest response is received from generation 60 (32.01%), 
and among female the highest response is received from generation 50 (22.13%).  
 





     In order to conduct this survey a questionnaire was first developed covering a 
wide range of aspects of evacuation information. It is also measured people’s opinion 
Profession
Male Female
Private employee 269 209
Public employee 43 42
Businessmen 144 86
Housewife 349
Part time worker 42 189
Self employed 23 2
Unemployed 245 157
University or vocational student 4 5





Generation 10 Generation20 Generation 30 Generation 40 Generation 50 Generation 60 Generation 70 or above Total
Male 2 20 70 86 172 259 200 809
Female 2 62 180 203 238 227 163 1075
Generation




about the effectiveness of the evacuation information plan. The survey was performed 
by the Urban & Transportation Planning Laboratory, Kanazawa University. A flowchart 
of procedures employed in the survey that is shown in below. 
 
1) Distribution and collection the questionnaire of survey 
 
2) Analysis the survey data 
 
3) Define the result of survey data and think about the more effective method of 
providing evacuation information 
4.3.3 Distribution time of the survey 
The survey was carried out from the 1st September to 4th September 2008.  
4.3.4 Methods of distribution 
There are many methods of distribution of questionnaires like postal, email, SMS, and 
direct distribution to the individual houses. In our survey, we distributed the 
questionnaires directly to the residents of their houses. 
4.3.5 Type of questions 
There may be many formats of questions. However, in our survey, we mainly used the 
structured type of questions. There were also some multiple choice questions. A few 
questions were of 5-point scale. The main purpose of the questionnaire is: 
1) To understand the actual situation of the affected area for the flood of 
Asanogawa River, and  
    2) Clarify the real condition of evacuation information plan on the disastrous day. 





4.3.6 What kind of Questions was delivered to answer? 
 
There were four main questions for the responders. They are about to know-  
1. The actual situation of the disaster day  
2. Satisfaction to the correspondence for the disaster management (to understand 
the situation about providing evacuation information).  
3. Understanding about the consciousness of the affected people. 
4. A personal attribute  
 
4.3.6.1 The actual situation of the disaster day  
 
- The actual situation of the evacuation information acquisition (when, where, or 
how the inhabitants of the precinct concerned were able to obtain information). 
 
- The actual situation of the evacuation (how and where the evacuee sheltered)  
 
- The actual situation of commuting / the attending school (whether a hindrance 
was reflected on commuting / attending school by the flood. If it is then how the 
hindrance affected them) 
 
- The actual situation of the traffic regulation and about the inundation or sand 
volume in the roads. 
 
- The actual situation of home and garage  
 
4.3.6.2 Satisfaction to the correspondence for the disaster management (to 
understand about the situation of delivered evacuation information) 





- In this section, the questions were included about the timing and transmission 
method of evacuation information. It was also asked to know the actual 
evacuation instruction, flood control, or restoration in the flood affected area. 
 




4.3.6.3 Understanding about the consciousness of the affected people  
 
- It was asked what they think about the future river maintenance and what they think 
about the damage that occurred by this flood disaster. 
 
- Besides, what is their intention about the administrative correspondence? 
 
4.3.6.4 Personal attributes 
- Personal information about the responders like his/her address, male/female, age, 
profession, family members, living in a house or apartment, have a car or not etc. 
 
4.3.7 Data Processing and Statistical analysis 
 All the data were organized and arranged according to different factors such as gender, 
profession, generation, etc. the data were also organized according to different aspects of 
evacuation information. There were different types of analysis like Cross tab, Chi square 
test, ANOVAs, T-test, etc. These analyses were done by using some statistical software 
such as SPSS, MS Excel etc. 
The purpose of the present study was to clarify the awareness and behavior of residents 
who were issued an evacuation advisory alert at the time of the Asanogawa Flood, 28 July 




2008 and to clarify what the related factors may be. 
 
4.3.7.1 Data Collection 
 
Nine thousand seven hundred and fifty surveys were directly distributed to residents 
within the evacuation zone roughly 5 weeks after the flood receded. One advantage to 
direct distributing surveys is that it creates an emotional enthusiasm to respond to the 
survey among the residents. During the distribution of survey questionnaires, we also 
provided the return envelope with postal stamps. This prevents the sample population 
from only including those evacuees whose properties received little to no damage during 
the flood. It is common practice to conduct hazard research immediately following an 
anticipated disaster (Tierney, 2002) because this “quick response “approach results in the 
most reliable findings (Stallings, 2002). Therefore, this study used the quick response 
approach in order to maximize the usefulness and accuracy of the survey data. 
Specifically, surveys were distributed to residents during1st September to 4th September 
2008. 
4.3.7.2 Summary of distribution and collection of the questionnaire survey 
 
In table 5, here it shows the summary of the questionnaire survey regarding the 
Asanogawa flood, 28th July 2008. 
Table 5: The summary of distribution and collection 
 
Number of the zone or area 10
Number of population 86,570
Number of the households 35,421
Number of the households sampled 9,750
Number of the respondents 1,970
Response rate(%) 20




4.3.7.3 Questionnaire execution summary 
 
The survey area is shown in Figure 12. In this research, the elementary school of the 
districts is designated as the minimum unit (area with red boundary and hatch) of 
survey, in the area which has been damaged. There are 12 schools in the surveyed area. 
Eleven school districts exist in the urban area, and one school district (Yuwaku Spa 




Figure 12: Location and population density of survey area 
   
The questionnaire was distributed to the flood affected residents from 1st September to 
4th September, 2008. Table 6 shows the distribution and collection of the questionnaire 
survey in detail. 
 




Table 6: Distribution and collection of the questionnaire survey 
 
No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 











Asanoga Oura Yuwaku 




No. of Population 6,326 6,372 3,536 6,449 8,478 10,929 15,814 4,899 8,053 1,142 
No. of households 2,822 2,974 1,508 2,820 3,606 4,376 6,523 1,769 2,756 462 
No. of households 
sampled 
1,800 500 800 1,500 200 500 2,300 1,200 650 300 
No. of respondents 251 194 263 286 61 28 505 124 79 73 
Response rate (%) 13.9 38.8 32.9 19.1 30.5 5.6 22.0 10.3 12.2 24.3 
Enlarged coefficient 11.2 15.3 5.7 9.9 59.1 156.3 12.9 14.3 34.9 6.3 
 
No. 11 12 13 Missing Total 
School District area Kuragetsu 
NishiKanaza
wa 




D － － － 
No. of Population 9,077 5,495 － － 86,570 
No.of households 3,403 2,402 － － 35,421 
No. of households 
sampled 
0 0 0 － 9,750 
No. of respondents － － 8 98 1,970 
Response rate (%) － － － － 20.2 
Enlarged coefficient － － － － 18.0 
 
 
4.3.7.4 Justification of the survey 
 
The questionnaire was distributed among the flood affected residents from 1st 
September to 4th September, 2008. 




Interval estimation equation (1) below was applied for official approval of the number 
of samples, width (largest scope of supply) of confidence interval the number of samples 
which are settled within the ±5% was calculated at 95% hit ratio. In addition, the 
parameter of flood damage occurrence at that time has made 20,739 households that 
issued the evacuation information in Kanazawa city at the disastrous time. 
  The number of samples assayed, and apply the following interval estimation equation 
(1), and calculates the number of samples that can fit the width of the confidence interval 
(maximum allowable range) within ± 5% with 95% hit rate. In addition, the number 
20,739 households that issued the evacuation information in Kanazawa city at disastrous 
times. 
The width of the confidence interval =               (1) 
Where 
N = number of original objects (20,739 households) 
n = number of samples 
k = constant of confidence interval (1.96, when the width of confidence interval is 95%) 
From equation (1), the value of samples of 20739 households is 1,430 or more. In 
this survey, we collected questionnaires from 1,970 households, and valid questionnaires 
were 1,864.So the survey result is reasonable. It shows the distribution and collection 
status of the questionnaire in Table 3. Distribution collection circumstance of the 
questionnaire is shown in table7. As shown in the table, the questionnaire collection is 
sufficient. The questionnaire distribution was done in the focusing area where damage 








5. Analysis of Result Discussion 
 
5.1. How the disaster affected people’s normal life 
 Here it is tried to clarify how the disaster affected the normal life, especially the actual 
condition of the commuting, work place (office, etc.) and attending school of the 
residence on the disastrous day. 
The main purpose was: 
- First, whether they commute or went to school as usual 
 
- Second, if they had experienced significant delays in the commuting time. 
 
- Third, if they had changed their means of transport. 
 
The result is shown in Figure 13 and 14. 
 
 







Went Delayed Cancelled No commuting or attending school





Figure 14: Transformation of the means of transportation [n=704] 
 
The findings of the analysis of the above two figures are: 
   During the flood about 55% percent of the people commuted. Among them, 70% 
people commuted as usual. However, about 8% of the people commuted with delay, about 
20% was found to cancel the commuting. In addition, on the day of flood damage, about 
90% or more residents were not using usual transportation. 
 
From the figure 15, we understand that the delay time extends substantially from 8:00 
a.m., delay time has occurred of about 20 minutes on average during the peak. Figure 16 
shows the results of calculating the percentage of people who delayed in their commuting 
by time zones. 
When it comes to 10:00 a.m., the information of flood damage is spread out, and the 
residence made a detour like they bypass the affected area at the time of commuting. Then 
it shows a tendency to decrease the amount of delay time. 








the rate is going to increase as time passes. On the disaster’s day, the affected areas have 




Figure 15: The average delayed time of commuting (n=449) 
 
 







































5.2. Sufficiency degree of correspondence for the disaster 
In this part, it analyzes the satisfaction degree of the respondents about the providing 
time of evacuation information, method of providing information, about the evacuation 
place, etc. To what degree of their own satisfaction about the disaster response. There was 
an appropriate score of different 10 stages. Table 7 shows the results of the 
appropriateness score e.g. in the case of the most appropriate (point score is 5) and the 
most inappropriate (point score is 1) by the respondents of different school district. 
 
Table 7: Degree of satisfaction of the response to the disaster 
(5-step evaluation of average and standard deviation) 




































































































































































































































(Red mark) Districts that have not been issued evacuation information and almost, there were no volunteer activities. 
The above table 10 shows that the district areas (Zaimoku, Meisei, Baba, Asanomachi) 
where the flood damage was big, there was the low satisfaction level of average points. 




On the other hand, the district areas where the damage was not big (Kosaka, Moroemachi, 
Asanogawa, Oura) there was a somewhat higher satisfaction level of average points. 
Standard deviations are larger in the neighboring school district (Moriyama machi, 
Kosaka) where there was significant damage but with less flooding. 
However, in view of the state that, the result was not more than three points (Neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied) by five phases of evaluations. Improvement by providing time 
of evacuation information, evacuation instruction method and the flood control activity 
will be necessary. 
 
5.3. Flood damage situation 
 
Here, it is shown that in what extent the damages occurred by the flood disaster for the 
home, automobile or garage of the residence. It shows the different school district areas 
by the result of the presence or absence of flooding in the home, garage or automobiles. 
It is investigated if there was the presence or absence of flood. If flooded then in what 
extent it was flooded e.g., flooded above the floor level, flooded the floor level. 
The result of flood damage to a home (detached/apartment/Mansion), is shown in Figure 
17. 
From Figure 17, it can be said that the six school districts region of "Yuwaku" "Meisei" 
"Zaimokuchou" "Asano machi," "Baba", and "Moroe machi", had the flood damage to 
the home. 
For flooded above the floor level, it was the highest percentage for "Yuwaku", we 
understand the magnitude of the damage in the Asano upper basin region. Further, in the 
flooded the floor level, the percentage of "Meisei" and "Asano Machi" is found to be 




relatively high. "Asano machi" is in the vicinity of the Shoei machi and Nakajima Ohashi, 
a school district area where the impact of flood damage was remarkable. 
 
Figure 17: Flood damage situation of home (Detached /apartment /Mansion) 
 
In Figure 18, it shows the result of the flood damage situation of garage. From Figure 
18, it is observed that there was a flood damage to the garage in seven school districtarea 
of "Yuwaku" "Asano machi," "Zaimokuchou" "Baba", "Meisei" "Moroe machi," and 
"Oura". 
The highest proportion of flood damage situation to garage, for both of flooded above 
floor level or flooded floor level was in Yuwaku school district area.The highest 
percentage of floor flooded to the home is also in Yuwaku school district area, It can be  
considered, there were many cases that garage with home were damaged on the floor 
flooded. 
 





Figure 18: Flood damage situation of garage 
 
Subsequently, in Figure 19 it shows the flood damage situation results of the automobile. 
From Figure 19, flooded to the car was found in six school districts of "Asano machi" 
"Yuwaku" "Meisei," "Baba", "Zaimokuchou", and "Moroe machi". The highest 
proportion of car inundation is in "Asano machi". It is because there is also underground 
car parking, etc., As a result, when it was flooded level of the home, it can be judged that 
damage had expanded to more than the floor level to the garage. 
 
 
Figure 19: Flood damage situation of the automobile 




5.4. Evacuation preparation information 
In this study, a questionnaire survey was conducted targeting the district that has been 
issued an "evacuation instruction." It is found in the figure 20 that, despite the evacuation 
preparation information is issued, only 23% of the residents had been able to get the 
information, and 20% of the residents did not know until the broadcast in the media, etc. 
The remaining about 60% residents, had not been noticed the evacuation preparation 
information at all. In addition, many residents obtained evacuation information while 
staying at home mainly by disaster broadcasting and radio. 
 
Figure 20: Evacuation preparation information [n=1805] 
 
5.5. The actual situation of evacuation 
   
  Here we studied that, after obtaining information, whether residents taken evacuation 
or not. In Figure 21, it is revealed that most of the affected people did not take evacuation. 
They have some reason for not taking evacuation. Since it was a flood, there is a 
possibility that it was thought that it would be sufficient to move to the second floor 
above. In addition, the evacuation advisory and evacuation instruction has been issued in 




the time when the flood already has started. Residents also submitted comments that they 
did not have enough time to escape. 
 
 
Figure 21: The actual situation of evacuation [n=1,687] 
 
5.6. Transportation at the time of evacuation 
 
At the time of evacuation, how did the affected people evacuate themselves or what kind 
of transportation they used to move from the flooded areas is shown in the figure 22. 
From this figure, it is revealed that the ratio of the residence who, moved by walking 
approximately was 50%, as for about 45% used the automobile. Maximum people chose 
walking for their evacuation. As the automobile breaks down with influence such as rising 
flood, also the possibility of becoming the obstruction of the rescue evacuation restoration 
and there is a chance to be shut in inside of the car. Because of all the above reasons it 
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Figure 22: Transportation at the time of evacuation [n=258] 
 
5.7. Administrative response to the flood disaster 
 
  Here the survey is trying to clarify the activities of the administrative authority of 
Kanazawa city. From this survey we had a clear picture of the satisfaction level of the 
residents in the affected area about the city government’s activities at the time of flood 
disaster. 
 
Figure 23: Administrative response to the flood [n= 1,643] 
From Figure 23, it is revealed that: 













No flooding Flooded floor level Flooded above floor level
It was very late A little late This is a limit It was early
Ratio(%)




was not at a satisfactory level at all.  
 
 Their activities observed delay in all over the flooded regions. About 50% of the 
residents said that city government’s correspondence was very late. 
 
5.8. A comparison between different sources of information acquisition 
Good communications with the public is one of the most important elements of an 
evacuation plan. The city government evacuation plans should have adequate provisions 
for communicating basic information to the residents in regards of when they should 
evacuate, the designated evacuation routes, what they should take with them, the location 
of shelters, and other information needed before they evacuate. Figure 24 shows the 
response rate for different sources of providing evacuation information to the residents 
around the Asanogawa river of Kanazawa city. From the analysis of the data, it is 
observed that the highest rate of acquisition of information is from DBP (e.g. Disaster 
Prevention Broadcast), then patrol car and afterwards gradually from television, 
neighbors, DIE-mail, radio and internet. 
 
Figure 24: The response rate for different sources of providing evacuation information [n=799] 
49.1 











DPB* =Disaster Prevention Broadcast




















5.9. Sources of information acquisition within different professions 
 
This study analyzes the methods to distribute evacuation information to the people of 
different profession, in order to investigate the ways of providing information to 
maximize evacuation effectiveness and minimize flood damage. The sources of providing 
evacuation information are as same as mentioned in the previous section. In this section, 
we shall describe about the different professions. 
Through the analysis of the data in figure 25, it is noticed that the acquisition method 
DBP is the highest response among the people of all professions. Then the patrol car and 
television is playing an important role as providing information method. A lot of people 
have information from their neighboring peoples. The response rate of DIE-mail is higher 
in the public employee, private employee and businessmen. 
 
 
Figure 25: Source of Information acquisition within different professions [n=629] 
 
5.10. Appropriateness of the aspects of evacuation information  

























































DPB* Patrol car Television Radio DIE* Internet Neighbours




the function of evacuation presence (e.g. Evacuation taken or not taken). The 
appropriateness score measured in the contrast of five different aspects. And the different 
aspects are displayed in Table 8.   
Table 8: Aspects of evacuation information 
 
The result will be displayed in figure 27. The total point score is 5 for every aspect of 
evacuation information like figure 26. 
 
Figure 26. Appropriateness score   
The findings of figure 27 are: volunteer support (VS) gets highest score that is 3.06 for 
taken evacuation, and 3.03 for not taken evacuation. Therefore, it may be argued that the 
support from volunteer was significant. But the degree of appropriateness for other 
aspects like TEP, TEA, and TED and AS became lower than 3 points. Therefore, the 
degree of appropriateness of the whole activities was not significant. From the5 stage 
average points of evaluation of the sufficiency degree, only the voluntary support is above 
3 points and other items support is lower than 3 points. So the sufficiency is seen to be 
low. In particular, evacuation information how to provide within proper timing and 
transmission will require improved as the appropriateness result is very low. 
*TEP: Timing of evacuation preparation
*TEA: Timing of evacuation advisory
*TED: Timing of evacuation directive
*AS: Administrative support
*VS: Volunteer support
5 4 3 2 1
 Completely appropriate Aprropriate Undecided Not appropriate Completely inappropriate
                   Appropriateness score for different contents





Figure 27: Appropriateness of the aspects of evacuation information 
 
5.11. Abundance of evacuation advisory information announcement in different 
regions 
  In this study, we tried to understand mainly, whether it was announced officially all 
the information like “evacuation advice.” And here it also justifies the residents’ 
acquisition level about the announcement information about evacuation advisory. 
Figure 28 describes that- 
(a) In the upper and middle basin, it is found that information about evacuation advice 
has not been transmitted sufficiently. 
(b) The availability of the announcement is different from place to place. It is observed 
that the rate of getting information is higher in the lower basin area of Asanogawa River. 
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Figure 28: Abundance of obtaining evacuation information [n= 1787] 
5.12. Location of the residents while getting the information about evacuation 
advisory 
The information’s procurement place of evacuation advice is shown in the figure 29.  
The figure shows that the information’s procurement place of the people who knew that 
evacuation advice was announced officially, the majority was the home. If it is the home, 
there is a possibility information being easy to procure through media such as prevention 
of disasters broadcast and a patrol car, television and radio. Furthermore, if it is the home, 
it is thought that it influences also the fact that it is the voice applying from the 
neighboring association. 
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5.13. How the residents acquired the information about evacuation advisory 
  
  Table 9 shows the list by which means the residence obtained evacuation order 
information by successively. 
From Table 9, information how the residents obtained the information of evacuation 
advisory, it was found that 'disaster prevention broadcasting ' is the most common. Then, 
It was found to be 'from the people' and 'patrol car', and 'Television' in many cases. In 
Asanogawa lower basin areas such as high recognition rate of evacuation advisory 
information 'Oura', 'Asano', not only ‘disaster prevention broadcasting’, and people 
obtained information from the patrol car is the high rate, the efficient patrol car is 
considered to be important. 
In addition, getting information from neighboring people is effective for an earlier appeal, 
but the information (from a neighbor), sometime may cause confusion such as the 
information complication, Information acquisition from the correct reporting is expected. 
The acquisition ratio from the disaster information email was very low, though it is 
thought very reliable. At the present time, the household possession rates of the mobile 
telephone exceed 90% (investigation of the mobile telephone household possession rate, 
Cabinet Office 2008, Japan).So it is thought that the disaster information email by mobile 
















Percentile Rank 1 Percentile Rank 2 Percentile Rank 3 Percentile Rank 4 Percentile Rank 5 
Zaimokuchou DPB 38.8  Television 19.0  Patrol Car 10.7  Neighbors 7.4  DIE-mail 6.6  
Meisei DPB 30.9  Neighbors 23.6  Patrol Car 9.1  Television 9.1  Radio 7.3  
Baba DPB 43.9  Neighbors 17.5  Television 14.0  Patrol Car 12.3  DIE-mail 4.4  
Asanomachi DPB 36.2  Neighbors 16.7  Patrol Car 15.9  Television 8.0  DIE-mail 4.3  
Moriyama  DPB 29.7  Television 21.6  DIE-mail 10.8  Radio 10.8  Patrol Car 8.1  
Kousaka DPB 60.0  Television 13.3  Internet 13.3  DIE-mail 6.7  Radio 6.7  
Moroemachi DPB 33.9  Neighbors 16.1  Patrol Car 14.4  Television 11.9  DIE-mail 5.9  
Asanogawa DPB 36.9  Patrol Car 21.4  Neighbors 12.6  Television 5.8  Radio 4.9  
Oura DPB 36.8  Patrol Carー 22.1  Neighbors 7.4  Television 5.9  Radio 5.9  
Yuwaku Neighbors 24.0  Television 16.0  DPB 12.0  Patrol Car 12.0  Radio 8.0  
 
 
5.14. Actual situation of evacuation order to residence 
In Asanogawa basin area, after the announcement of evacuation advisory in the school 
district areas, within 5 minutes [at 8:50] there was an announcement of the evacuation 
order. From the figure 30, figure 31 and from the table 10, we can understand the actual 
situation of an evacuation order, like about the acknowledgement of the evacuation order, 
where the residence obtained the information and by which mean they obtained the 
information. 
Figure 3o shows, it was same as evacuation advisory that the residence of more affected 
areas could not get the information properly. Most of the people who lived in the lower 
basin of Asanogawa river acknowledged the evacuation order. Comparison of the 
evacuation advisory, the acknowledgement of evacuation order was low on average. It 
was a very little difference e.g. only five minutes between the proving time of evacuation 
advisory and evacuation order. That's why, there was a possibility of not getting enough 




time for evacuation preparation.  
 
Figure 30: Actual situation of obtaining information about evacuation order 
  
 Then, it is shown in Figure31, the location of getting evacuation order information. From 
Figure 31, people where they accessed for information on evacuation order has been 
issued, the most was the home the same as in the evacuation advisory. 
 
Figure 31: Location of obtaining evacuation order 
  Then, table 10 shows the list what kind of method the residence obtained evacuation 
order information by successively. From Table 10, how to obtain the information of 
evacuation order was also found to be the same as those of the evacuation advisory 




'disaster prevention broadcasting ' is the most common. However, compared to the 
evacuation advisory, the ratio becomes slightly smaller of 'from the neighboring people', 
it suggests a tendency that the residents were trying to obtain accurate information from 
such as 'patrol car'. 
Table 10: The information acquisition means of the evacuation order 
School 
District Area 
Percentile Rank 1 Percentile Rank 2 Percentile Rank 3 Percentile Rank 4 Percentile Rank 5 
Zaimokuchou DPB 41.6  Television 23.4  Neighbors 9.1  Patrol Car 7.8  DIE-mail 6.5  
Meisei Neighbors 36.8  DPB 26.3  Patrol Car 10.5  DIE-mail 5.3  Television 5.3  
Baba DPB 43.5  Neighbors 18.8  Patrol Car 12.9  Television 12.9  DIE-mail 3.5  
Asanomachi DPB 30.6  Patrol Car 19.8  Neighbors 16.5  DIE-mail 7.4  Television 5.8  
Moriyama  DPB 31.0  Patrol Car 17.2  Television 13.8  Radio 13.8  DIE-mail 10.3  
Kousaka DPB 50.0  Internet 25.0  DIE-mail 8.3  Patrol Car 8.3  Television 8.3  
Moroemachi DPB 34.1  Neighbors 19.4  Patrol Car 13.9  Television 12.3  Radio 5.2  
Asanogawa DPB 33.0  Patrol Car 25.5  Neighbors 20.2  Television 7.4  Radio 3.2  
Oura DPB 32.8  Patrol Car 27.9  Neighbors 8.2  Television 8.2  Radio 4.9  
Yuwaku DPB 23.1  Patrol Car 15.4  Neighbors 15.4  Television 7.7  －  
 
 
5.15. Information acquisition level of residents about the evacuation place 
 
Sheltering is one of the most important considerations when planning evacuations. 
However, it is also important if the residents of the city are properly acknowledged about 
the definite shelter places. In the event of a disaster, depending on whether the shelter is 
known to residents in advance, we will get a very effective evacuation. 
Here it was aimed to understand the acquisition level, e.g., prior knowledge, known by 
this disaster or unknown about the shelter places of the localities through figure 32. 
 





Figure 32: Information acquisition level of the shelter places [n=1805] 
By analysis, the findings of the figure 32 are: 
 “Oura” has a very large percentage of prior knowledge e.g. about 90%; prior 
knowledge of the other districts shows about 65% to 70%. 
 Acknowledgement by this disaster has increased significantly in Kousaka, 
Zaimokuchou and Asanogawa. 
 In many places, nearly from 20% to 30% of the residents do not know about 
evacuation place at all. 
 The region of Asanogawa town and Moroemachi, where comparatively the resident 
is many, is thought that prevention of disaster consciousness increased with the latest 
flood disaster 
 
5.16. Information acquisition level of the shelter places on average 
Figure 33 presents a comparison of the acknowledgement in average for all regions. 










































Prior knowledge Known by this disaster Unknown




knowledge in average about the shelter places. 
 
 
Figure 33: Information acquisition level of the shelter place in average [n=1805] 
 
5.17. Acquisition of the flood hazard map 
  Here in figures 34 to 36, it is shown all about the flood hazard map. The supported 
data was collected from Ishikawa prefecture. It is revealed that only 25% of the affected 
residence knew about the flood hazard map. A very few people said that the hazard map 
was helpful to them. 
 
 

































Figure 35: Flood hazard map was helpful or not  
 
 
5.19 Why flood hazard map was not useful. 
 
 
Figure 36: Why flood hazard map was not useful. 
 
5.20. Rate of taking evacuation in response to evacuation preparation information 
   
In this part, the questionnaire is designed to grasp the evacuation situation of the residents, 
according to their acknowledgement of evacuation preparation information. The city 
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Here it is analyzed how about the effect of the administration announcement to the victims 
for taking their evacuation in the designated shelter places of the city. It is explained by 
figure 37. 
 
Figure 37: Rate of taking evacuation versus evacuation preparation information [n=1357] 
 
It can be remarked by the analysis of figure 37: 
(a) The percentage of the people those take evacuation is very low. 
(b) A large number of people did not take evacuation though they were informed about 
the evacuation preparation. 
 
5.21. Awareness and responsiveness to flood risk 
 
The 2008 flood was the first time in 55 years that the around in the Asanogawa River 
area has been damaged by massive flooding due to the failure of levees. Before the 
flood disaster, the local inhabitants felt secure in believing that the Asanogawa River 
would not flood. Now, after the flood damage, based on the survey response it is shown 













































that their concern is rising up. 
  Figure 38 reflects the resident’s opinion about the raising of the river bank, 
maintenance of the river bed and measuring the flood gate. Now it is shown that 46% 
people give importance about the maintenance of the river bed. 
 
Figure 38: Residents’ awareness of flood risk [n= 1496]  
(Questionnaire survey, Ishikawa Prefecture) 
 
5.22. Peoples’ reaction to the disaster situation 
 
The nature of people’s reaction to an event might also depend on the type of flooding. 
People face slow-onset flooding (riverine floods) with elaborate responses, which are 
not very limited by warning, delay or “labor force”. For fast-onset flooding (flash floods), 
flood-proofing appears to be the most immediate response, but necessitates a minimum 
warning because of the speed at which the water rises. 
Here, the opinion of the people about the local city government’s responsibility can 
be displayed in figure 39. In this part, a questionnaire was aimed to get an idea of their 
satisfaction level to the administrative correspondence and the levee protection facility of 
administration. It was asked to express their satisfaction about the city authorities over all 













to the respondent’s answer, it can be said that they were not happy with the measures 
taken by the city authority to control the flood situation. 
 
 
Figure 39: People’s reaction to the disaster situation [n= 1643] 
 
5.23. Analysis on the personal attributes of residence. 
 
Here it is analyzed the personal information about the responders like his/her address, 
male/female, age, profession, family members, living in a house or apartment, have a 
car or not etc. 
The distribution of the individuals surveyed in this study is graphically shown in Figure 
40 to Figure 45 considering their personal attributes such as gender, age, type of house, 
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(I) It was analyzed by the collected data that a large number of people got the evacuation 
information from their neighborhoods. 
  Though a lot of people have information from their neighborhood, but this kind of 
information is not always correct.  Therefore, it may be better to ignore such information 
that is provided by the neighboring people. 
(Ⅱ) It is observed that the percentage of having information in the DIE-mail is very low 
e.g. about 6%. 
  But DIE-mail can be a major source of having evacuation information as a large 
number of people are using cell phone nowadays. Currently, the household possession 
rates of the mobile telephone exceed 90% in Japan (Survey Report, Cabinet Office 2008, 
Japan).  
(Ⅲ) People those who are living in the lower basin and upper basin, they have enough 
prior knowledge about the flood and evacuation. But the people those are living inside of 
the city area (middle basin), don’t have much prior knowledge about the information of 
flood and as well as about the evacuation place. 
Therefore, it may be suggested that it would be better to perform disaster drill 
frequently, at least once or twice in a year about the evacuation information plan among 
the people who are living in the city area. By this step, people would be more conscious 
and trained in the preparation of flood disaster or for any other natural calamities in future.  
(Ⅳ) People’s knowledge about the flood hazard and about self-protection, as well as good 
warning information, would help them to better perform emergency measures. Therefore, 




flood warnings should be released with more detailed information about expected water 
levels, time to peak flows and recommendations for appropriate response. However, the 
time and the number of people available to undertake emergency measures are the most 
important factors during the response phase. Therefore, longer lead times of early 
warnings are needed, especially in mountainous regions. Further, it would be worthwhile 
to think about improving response capacities in flood situations, e.g. by activating the 




In July 28, 2008 early morning, Kanazawa city was hit by severe local torrential heavy 
rain. As a result, Asanogawa is flooded for the first time in 55 years, and large-scale 
flooding has occurred in Kanazawa city. During that enormous damage, about 20000 
households were provided evacuation advisory information among 50,000 residents in 
the Asanogawa river basin. According the result of the survey, despite the evacuation 
preparation information is issued, only 23% of the residents had been able to obtain the 
information, and 20% of the residents did not know until the information broadcasted in 
the media, etc. The remaining about 60% residents, had not been noticed the evacuation 
preparation information at all. In addition, many residents obtained evacuation 
information while staying at home mainly by disaster broadcasting and radio. During the 
flood about 55% percent of the people commuted. Among them, 70% people commuted 
to their schools or workplaces as usual. However, about 8% of the people commuted with 
delay, about 20% were found to cancel the commuting. In addition, on the day of flood 
damage, about 90% or more residents were not using usual transportation. That means 
they have changed or intended to ride buses from the car or motorcycle, etc. Many people 




felt free to commute to job on foot rather than using vehicles. 
As described above, it is revealed that many residents did not care about the evacuation 
information of flood disaster provided by city government. And they followed the usual 
daily lives on the day of disaster. It is also found that disaster prevention awareness among 
the residents was very low. In the areas without flood experience, early provided 
evacuation information was not effective. However, the areas with the previous flood 
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２ ０ ０ ８ 年 ７ 月２ ８ 日 金沢豪雨災害の避難状況に関するアン ケート にご協力く ださ い。  
 
 ７ 月２ ８ 日早朝、 金沢市を襲っ た集中豪雨により 、 浅野川流域を中心に甚大な被害をも たら し まし た。 現在、 復
旧活動が続けら れていますが、 一部地区では、 依然と し て避難勧告が継続中の状態です。 本調査では、 7 月 28 日 金
沢豪雨災害にて、 避難準備および避難勧告、 避難指示が出さ れた地区を対象に、 避難当時の実態をお聞き し 、 今後
の避難計画策定の参考にさ せていただき たいと 考えており ます。  
お忙し いと こ ろ 申し 訳あり ませんが、 ご協力を お願いいたし ます。 なお、 本調査で得ら れた結果は、 本目的以外
に利用するこ と はあり ません。  
＜調査主体＞ 金沢大学理工研究域 交通まちづく り 研究室 教授 高山純一（ 担当 轟直希）  
 
問１．お住まいの地域（地区）の避難場所をご存知でしたか。 
 １ ． 事前に知っ ていた   ２ ． 今回の災害で知っ た   ３ ． 知ら ない 
 
問２－１．「避難準備情報」地区が発令されたことを知っていましたか。 
１ ． 知っ ていた   ２ ． 知ら なかっ た   ３ ． 出さ れていない 
問２－２．問１－１で「１．知っていた」と答えた方に伺います。いつ、どのような方法で知りましたか。 
①いつ（情報入手時間）    午前（   ） 時 （   ） 分こ ろ 入手 
 ②どこで（情報入手場所）  １ ． 自宅 ２ ． その他（     ）  
 ③どのように（情報入手方法）  １ ． 防災放送（ 同報防災無線）   ２ ． パト ロールカ ー  ３ ．  テレビ  
４ ． ラ ジオ  ５ ． 災害情報メ ール  ６ ． インタ ーネッ ト   
７ ． 近所の人から   ８ ． その他（           ）   
問２－３．「避難準備情報」が発令されてから、どのような避難準備をされましたか。あてはまるもの全てに○をつ
けてください。ご家族分を準備された方は、１人分としてお答えください。 
 ①衣服  １ ．準備なし   ２ ．タ オル程度  ３ ．１ 泊程度  ４ ．２ 泊程度  ５ ．その他（       ） 
 ②水分  １ ．準備なし   ２ ．５ ０ ０ mℓ程度  ３ ．１ ℓ程度  ４ ．２ ℓ程度  ５ ．その他（      ）  
 ③食料  １ ．準備なし   ２ ．非常食  ３ ．軽食  ４ ．２ 食分程度  ５ ．その他（         ）  
④通信機器  １ ．準備なし   ２ ．携帯電話  ３ ．ラ ジオ  ４ ．パソ コ ン   ５ ．その他（        ）  
 ⑤貴重品  １ ． 現金  ２ ． 通帳  ３ ． 貴金属  ４ ． その他（           ）  
 ⑥その他    ［             ］ 
 
問３－１．「避難勧告」の情報が発令されたことを知っていましたか。 
１ ． 知っ ていた   ２ ． 知ら なかっ た   ３ ． 出さ れていない 
問３－２．問３－１で「１．知っていた」と答えた方に伺います。いつ、どのような方法で知りましたか。 
①いつ（情報入手時間）    午前（   ） 時 （   ） 分こ ろ 入手 
 ②どこで（情報入手場所）  １ ． 自宅 ２ ． その他（     ）  
 ③どのように（情報入手方法）  １ ． 防災放送（ 同報防災無線）   ２ ． パト ロールカ ー  ３ ．  テレビ  
４ ． ラ ジオ  ５ ． 災害情報メ ール  ６ ． インタ ーネッ ト   
７ ． 近所の人から   ８ ． その他（           ）   
【最初の情報入手について】 
【最初の情報入手について】 







１ ． 知っ ていた   ２ ． 知ら なかっ た   ３ ． 出さ れていない 
問４－２．問４－１で「１．知っていた」と答えた方に伺います。いつ、どのような方法で知りましたか。 
①いつ（情報入手時間）    午前（   ） 時 （   ） 分こ ろ 入手 
 ②どこで（情報入手場所）  １ ． 自宅 ２ ． その他（     ）  
 ③どのように（情報入手方法）  １ ． 防災放送（ 同報防災無線）   ２ ． パト ロールカ ー  ３ ．  テレビ  
４ ． ラ ジオ  ５ ． 災害情報メ ール  ６ ． インタ ーネッ ト   




 ①避難の有無  １ ． 避難し た   ２ ． 避難し なかっ た   ３ ． 知ら なかっ た 
 ②避難方法  １ ． 徒歩   ２ ． 自動車   ３ ． その他（         ）  





内容 適切                     不適
切      
避難準備のタ イ ミ ング（ 情報提供時間）  ５  ４  ３  ２  １  
避難勧告のタ イ ミ ング（ 情報提供時間）  ５  ４  ３  ２  １  
避難指示のタ イ ミ ング（ 情報提供時間）  ５  ４  ３  ２  １  
避難情報の伝達方法 ５  ４  ３  ２  １  
避難の誘導方法 ５  ４  ３  ２  １  
災害情報の伝達方法 ５  ４  ３  ２  １  
水防活動（ 洪水時）  ５  ４  ３  ２  １  
復旧活動（ 洪水後）  ５  ４  ３  ２  １  
行政の支援 ５  ４  ３  ２  １  
ボラ ンティ アの支援 ５  ４  ３  ２  １  
 






 ■ 通勤・通学を普段通り  １．行った    ２．遅らせた   ３．取りやめた 
■ 自宅出発時刻 （  ）時 （  ）分 ■ 勤務先・学校等到着時刻 （  ）時 （  ）分 
 ■ 通常時に比べて（   ）分ほど通勤・通学時間が長くかかった。 
 ■ 通勤・通学した場合、交通手段は   １．変わらない  ２．変わった（     ）⇒（     ） 


















































 ①ご自宅（戸建・アパート・マンション） １ ． 床上浸水   ２ ． 床下浸水   ３ ． 浸水なし  
 ②車庫     １ ． 非所有  ２ ． 床上浸水  ３ ． 床下浸水  ４ ． 浸水なし  





①洪水の被害   １．これだけの降水量であれば仕方ない  ２．もう少し被害を抑えることができた 
         ３．たとえこのような豪雨でも、このような被害が出ることは許されない 
②行政の対応   １．早かった  ２．これくらいで十分  ３．遅かった 
③水防施設    １．今回の対応で十分  ２．現状の設備内でより効果的に防ぐ（効果的な水門の開閉） 
         ３．さらなる整備が必要（ １．堤防かさ上げ  ２．河床整備  ３．切り欠き部対策 ） 
問１０．あなた自身についてお伺いします。 
問１０－１．あなたのお住まいをお答えください。 
郵便番号     －       （          ） 町（       ） 丁目 
問１０－２．あなたの性別をお答えください。 
 １ ． 男性   ２ ． 女性 
問１０－３．あなたの年齢をお答えください。 
１ ． １ ０ 代   ２ ． ２ ０ 代   ３ ． ３ ０ 代   ４ ． ４ ０ 代   ５ ． ５ ０ 代   ６ ． ６ ０ 代    
７ ． ７ ０ 代以上 
問１０－４．あなたの職業をお答えください。 
 １ ． 会社員   ２ ． 自営業   ３ ． 公務員   ４ ． 農林漁業   ５ ． 主婦   ６ ． 大学・ 専門学校生   
７ ． 中高生   ８ ． パート ・ アルバイ ト    ９ ． 無職   10． その他（             ）  
問１０－５．あなたの通勤・通学に使う交通手段についてお答えください。（複数選択可） 
１ ． 徒歩   ２ ． 自転車   ３ ． 二輪車（ バイク ）    ４ ． 自動車   ５ ． ふら っ と バス    
６ ．北鉄バス    ７ ． JR（ 鉄道）    ８ ．北鉄（ 鉄道）    １ ０ ．通勤通学なし   １ １ ．その他（     ）  
問１０－６．あなたのお住まいの住居形態についてお答えください。 
 １ ． 戸建て住宅（ 所有）   ２ ． 戸建て住宅（ 賃貸）   ３ ． マンショ ン（ 所有）   ４ ． マンショ ン（ 賃貸）  
 ５ ． アパート   ６ ． その他（           ）  
問１０－７．あなたの家族構成についてお答えください。 
 １ ． 一人暮ら し   ２ ． 夫婦（ ２ 人）   ３ ． ２ 世代同居（ 夫婦と 子供）    
４ ． ３ 世代同居（ 祖父母と 夫婦と 子供）   ５ ． その他（            ）  
 
ご協力あり がと う ございまし た。 お渡し の封筒に入れ、 １ ～２ 週間以内にお近く のポスト にご投函く ださ い。  
